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I. INTRODUCTION
The obligations transferred to new owners under the federal labor law
successorship doctrine increasingly constrain the common law freedom
of entrepreneurs to acquire and dispose of business entities. The unas-
sumed liabilities imposed upon new owners of labor intensive enterprises
now extend far beyond even the original Taft-Hartley arbitration, union
bargaining, and remedial obligations.' As additional financial burdens
and contractual restraints incurred by predecessors are transferred
wholesale to bona fide "successors," 2 their cumulative impact severely
restricts preexisting managerial "start-up" flexibility, significantly esca-
lates financial transaction costs for both sellers and buyers, and saddles
buyers with other long-range labor costs that are incalculable at the time
of ownership transfer.
DMspite the proliferation of labor-related liabilities, prospective pur-
chasers often neglect to consider these consequences prior to acquisition
of the predecessor's enterprise. Those purchasers who do so out of the
mistaken belief that these liabilities are inconsequential are in for an un-
pleasant surprise. Even when a buyer undertakes an effort to measure
the seller's labor circumstances against the economics of the purchase,
the current unpredictable and confusing criteria adopted to determine
successorship3 renders illusory any accurate prediction of which liabili-
1. Golden State Bottling Co. v. NLRB, 414 U.S. 168 (1973); NLRB v. Bums Int'l Sec. Serv.
Inc., 406 U.S. 272 (1972); John Wiley & Sons v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543 (1964).
2. Unless otherwise stated, the terms "successor" and "bona fide successor" are interchangea-
ble terms of art defining a new owner who acquires unassumed obligations of the predecessor solely
by virtue of its status as a successor employer, who is unrelated to predecessor in terms of common
ownership, and who has neither participated in the predecessor's violations nor entered into the sale
to avoid any obligations incurred by the predecessor.
3. See Howard Johnson Co. v. Detroit Local Joint Executive Bd., 417 U.S. 249, 262 n.9 (1974)
("There is, and can be, no single definition of 'successorship' which is applicable in every legal con-
text. A new employer, in other words, may be a successor for some purposes and not for others.")
See also International Ass'n of Machinists, Dist. Lodge 94 v. NLRB, 414 F.2d 1135, 1139 (D.C.
Cir.), cert denied, 396 U.S. 889 (1969) (Leventhal, J., concurring) (test of successorship is largely
"impressionistic").
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ties and obligations will be imposed.
Although commentators debate the proper balance between business
transfer prerogatives and investor flexibility on one hand, and collective
agreement enforceability and employee job security on the other,4 none
has yet compiled a comprehensive survey of existing and potential labor
law liabilities. This article addresses that void.
Such a survey is particularly relevant because in this decade market
entrance and expansion have been accomplished by an accelerating rate
of corporate stock and assets purchases, takeovers, leveraged buyouts,
and mergers.5 This marketplace dynamic is now imperiled by the costly
obligations the successor doctrine transfers to new owners. The eco-
nomic reality is that the buyer is unable to anticipate, and therefore un-
able to reflect in the purchase price, all these encumbrances. As these
fiscal and labor costs continue to increase, investors will be unable to
afford to use assets or stock purchases to salvage declining businesses or
to open new markets. The detrimental consequences of these restrictions
on free transferability will be fewer jobs preserved or created for our
workforce.
This survey begins in Part II with an examination of the 1973 Supreme
Court decision in Golden State Bottling Co. v. NLRB. That decision has
served as the touchstone for the rapid expansion of successor liability
from the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) to other federal labor
statutes and state law. Part III marks the evolution of successor liability
under the NLRA. Part IV chronicles the transfer of liabilities to other
federal statutes and state laws, and Part V forecasts liabilities likely to be
imposed under other statutes. Part VI describes the evolution of the suc-
cessorship doctrine into an anticompetitive restraint on business transfer-
ability which replaces consideration of managerial prerogative with
nearly per se liability. Finally, the last section offers new owners some
practical options for avoiding or indemnifying these liabilities, but reluc-
4. See, e.g., J. ATLESON, VALUES AND ASSUMPTIONS IN AMERICAN LABOR LAW 160-70
(1983) (imbalance against employee interests); Bakaly & Bryan, Survival of the Bargaining Agree-
ment: The Effect of Burns, 27 VAND. L. REV. 117, 128-29 (1974) (survival of labor contract obliga-
tions after transfer of ownership restricts capital mobility); Van Wezel Stone, Labor and the
Corporate Structure, 55 U. CHI. L. REv. 73, 102-05 (1988) (existing successorship law provides no
role for labor in corporate decision making).
5. Dobrzynski, For Better or for Worse?, Bus. WK., Jan. 12, 1987, at 38, 38-39 (In a four year
pre-1987 period, 12,200 companies and corporate divisions transferred ownership at cost of $490
billion.).
1989]
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tantly concludes that in most transfers the new owner is now the de jure
surety for any of the predecessor's labor-related obligations.
II. GOLDEN STATE BOITLING UNCAPS SUCCESSOR LIABILITY
In his brief in Golden State Bottling Co. v. NLRB 6 Solicitor General
Bork stated:
The principal question in this case is whether the [Labor] Board may prop-
erly require a bona fide successor employer (All American), who acquires
its predecessor's business (Golden State) with knowledge that the predeces-
sor has failed to remedy its unfair labor practice in discharging an em-
ployee, may be required to reinstate the employee with back pay.7
The Supreme Court, deeply divided on most labor cases, unanimously
answered "yes" to the posed question. To reach this result, the Court, as
discussed below, either greatly expanded or created an exception to the
limitations embodied in Rule 65(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure which protects unnamed entities from the reach of court injunc-
tions. The Court also expanded an early NLRA decision beyond any
logical limitation, and engrafted upon the NLRA a broad "public pol-
icy" justification for extending National Labor Relations Board (NLRB
or Labor Board) orders beyond the statutory standard of "any person
named in the complaint"' to reach an innocent purchaser. The Court's
unanimous decision on these questionable grounds can perhaps be ratio-
nalized only by its sympathy for an employee's ten year odyssey in search
of compensatory redress for his discharge by Golden State.
In August 1963, Golden State General Manager Gene Schilling dis-
charged Baker from his position as a driver-salesman in its Pepsi-Cola
Bottling Division. Baker filed an unfair labor practice charge with the
Labor Board. The NLRB concluded that Golden State unlawfully dis-
charged Baker because of his support for the Teamsters Union, and or-
dered Golden State and "its successors" to offer Baker immediate
reinstatement with full back pay to the date of reemployment.9 Golden
State refused to comply. The Ninth Circuit adopted and enforced the
order in December 1965.10
6. 414 U.S. 168 (1973).
7. Brief for the National Labor Relations Board at 15, Golden State, 414 U.S. 168 (1973) (No.
72-702). The Supreme Court agreed with this formulation. Golden State, 414 U.S. at 170.
8. See infra Part II(B).
9. Golden State, 147 N.L.R.B. 410, 415 (1964).
10. NLRB v. Golden State Bottling Co., 353 F.2d 667 (9th Cir. 1965),
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Over two years later, in January 1968, Golden State sold its assets in
the Bottling Division to All American Beverage, Inc. All American ac-
quired the machinery, buildings, accounts receivable, trade name, and
real estate of the Golden State bottling operation. The sales agreement,
executed by Schilling as secretary of Golden State, did not refer to the
Baker discharge proceeding. The agreement enumerated, however, other
liabilities to be assumed by All American, and warranted that no pending
litigation existed against the Bottling Division. The sale removed Golden
State from the soft drink bottling and distribution business entirely.
All American continued the bottling business in the same plant with-
out operational hiatus or modification. All American hired all but a few
of Golden State's employees. It also hired Golden State's twelve distrib-
utors who continued to distribute the same products to the same custom-
ers. Golden State's supervisory and managerial staff transferred to All
American, including Schilling, who was hired as general manager and
president of the bottling operation.
Two weeks after the Ninth Circuit entered a final decree on other as-
pects of the Labor Board's original decision against Golden State,1
Schilling, as president of All American's Bottling Division, on behalf of
Golden State, offered Baker reinstatement as a driver-salesman. At this
time (November 1968), because of the January 1968 sale to All Ameri-
can, Schilling had no authority to represent Golden State, and Golden
State, no longer in the soft drink distribution business, was in no position
to rehire Baker. Nevertheless, in November 1969, Golden State re-
sponded to the Labor Board's back pay proceeding by claiming it had
offered reinstatement to Baker, which would toll back pay as of that date.
This response did not mention that All American had been operating the
bottling business for nearly two years.12 Golden State did not admit to
the January 1968 sale of the business until a second back pay proceeding
was initiated against both Golden State and All American.13 On this
record of equivocation-if not duplicity-the Labor Board inferred that
Golden State had attempted to conceal the sale to frustrate the Labor
11. NLRB v. Golden State Bottling Co., 401 F.2d 454 (9th Cir. 1968) (on petition for
rehearing).
12. The response was verified "under penalty of perjury" by E.J. Crofoot as president of
Golden State. Brief for the National Labor Relations Board at 445 (Appendix B), Golden State
Bottling Co. v. NLRB, 414 U.S. 168 (1973) (No. 72-702).
13. Joint Appendix at 39, Golden State Bottling Co. v. NLRB, 414 U.S. 168 (1973) (No. 72-
702).
1989]
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Board's effort to obtain backpay and reinstatement for Baker.' 4
The Supreme Court cited this factual conclusion and found "no justifi-
cation" for disturbing the Labor Board's finding that All American's
claim of ignorance about the Baker litigation before the date of transfer
was "incredible."' 5 Accordingly, the Court agreed that All American
acquired Golden State's operation with knowledge of the Labor Board's
order requiring Baker's reinstatement with back pay.' 6 While the record
before the Court renders these factual affirmances unremarkable, the sig-
nificance of Golden State to the subsequent escalation of labor law liabil-
ity for new owners rests on its questionable elimination of the legal
restraints found in both Rule 65(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure and statutes limiting the authority of courts and administrative
agencies to include unnamed new owners within existing orders.
4. Rule 65(d)
Rule 65(d) 7 explicitly permits administrative and judicial orders to
reach "the parties to the action," those in a beneficial relationship with
the named party such as officers, agents, servants, employees and attor-
neys, and "those persons in active concert or participation with them."' 8
Unless a new owner falls within one of these three categories, the Rule
precludes the imposition of obligations, presumably codifying due pro-
cess requirements. Dilution of the procedural and substantive safeguards
14. Pepsi-Cola Bottling of Sacramento, 187 N.L.R.B. 1017, 1021 (1971).
15. 414 U.S. at 173-74.
16. Id. at 174. The opinion, however, is ambiguous about whether the successor must have
actual or constructive notice before the purchase date, and whether the successor must have knowl-
edge of NLRB or circuit court adjudicated unfair labor practices or merely knowledge of specific
NLRB charges served upon the seller. The Supreme Court used the phrase "unfair labor practice
litigation" to describe the subject of the purchaser's knowledge. Id. at 173. The Labor Board's
remedial order against Golden State had been enforced by the Ninth Circuit over two years prior to
the date of sale. There was no dispute that All American was a "successor" to Golden State, even
under the narrow definition set forth by the dissenters in NLRB v. Bums Int'l Sec. Serv. Inc., 406
U.S. 272 (1972), discussed infra notes 47-52 and accompanying text. Id. at 182-83 n.5.
In addition, the Court's opinion is silent about which party (the NLRB or the new owner) has the
burden of proof on the presence or absence of knowledge.
17. Federal rules provide, in pertinent part, that "fe]very order granting an injunction and
every restraining order . . . is binding only upon the parties to the action, their officers, agents,
servants, employees, and attorneys, and upon those persons in active concert or participation with
them who receive actual notice of the order by personal service or otherwise." FED. R. CIV. P.
65(d).
18. Id. Cf. Rendleman, Beyond Contempt: Obligors to Injunctions, 53 TEx. L. REv. 873, 908
(1975) (under traditional doctrine, procedural rules, or the Constitution, only named parties, agents
of parties, and associates-confederates of parties are bound by injunctions).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol67/iss2/5
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embodied in the statute and the Constitution extends federal government
interdiction of private business relationships well beyond the justification
provided by federal labor policy. The Supreme Court, however, held in
Regal Knitwear Co. v. NLRB 19 that a disguised continuance of the viola-
tor (albeit labeled as a "successor" by the Labor Board in its order) could
be required to remedy what in reality were its own violations without
running afoul of due process requirements. This could occur where a
complete identity of interests exists between the violator and its alter
ego. 20
In Golden State, the Court mischaracterized its Regal Knitwear hold-
ing,2 and failed to distinguish between the second and third Rule 65(d)
categories (beneficial relationship and active concert), resulting in a pro
tanto amendment to Rule 65(d). This judicial amendment swept within
it transferees without the associational ties enumerated in the Rule, who
had neither participated in the violation, nor collusively attempted to
evade or frustrate the original order.
In its analysis, the Golden State Court first posited that Regal Knitwear
"left open" the question of whether Labor Board orders could reach in-
nocent purchasers. From this erroneous premise the Court then an-
nounced that the Regal Knitwear decision affirmatively held that Rule
65(d) was not a bar to such orders.22 Perhaps one could argue that a
succession in a very limited sense occurred in Regal Knitwear between
the violator and the alter ego entity, and thus the "successor" label
linked the alter ego transferor to the original order. However, Regal
Knitwear recognized that independent transferees were beyond the scope
of Rule 65(d): "[t]he courts ... may not grant an enforcement order or
injunction so broad as to make punishable the conduct of persons who
act independently and whose rights have not been adjudged according to
law.",23
Unlike Regal Knitwear's disguised continuance, Golden State's and
All American's ownerships were entirely independent. The sale discon-
tinued Golden State's bottling and distribution business entirely, and
Golden State did not undertake the assets sale in an attempt to evade the
Labor Board's original reinstatement and back pay order. Thus, before
19. 324 U.S. 9 (1945).
20. Id. at 14.
21. Id. at 9.
22. 414 U.S. at 179.
23. 324 U.S. at 13 (dictum).
19891
Washington University Open Scholarship
382 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
construing Rule 65(d) to encompass the degree of corporate autonomy
found in the sale to All American, the Court should have confronted
directly the dictum of Regal Knitwear.
Instead, the Court seized on the successor concept to establish an un-
defined "privity" between the predecessor and the successor. This priv-
ity in turn created an identity of interests24 between All American and
Golden State in the "employing enterprise." 2 All American, however,
had no beneficial association with Golden State similar to those enumer-
ated in Rule 65(d).26 Further, the catalogue of persons specified in the
Rule as being bound by a court order just as the named party is bound
makes no mention of the term "successor." Moreover, the term "priv-
ity," whatever it may mean,27 is also absent from the Rule. The Court
thus amended the Rule by adding the term "successor" as an equivalent
of an agent, employee, or officer. A "successor," however, is not subject
to the same control or direction as people in these other categories.
Although the Court addressed this issue in legal, yet imprecise, terms, its
discussion masks its value judgment that a buyer-seller relationship alone
is adequate to render an independent transferee an obligor under Rule
65(d).28
The Court also referred to All American's participation in the separate
back pay proceeding as a basis for binding All American to the Labor
Board's order. That proceeding allowed All American the opportunity
to contest knowledge and successor status but not liability vel non.29 The
Court apparently did not regard this participation as transforming All
American into a "party to the action," perhaps because All American
was not a party to the unfair labor practice proceeding against Golden
24. The Court's creation of this "privity" tied to the "locus" of the unfair labor practice, con-
tinued unchanged by All American, allowed it to ultimately conclude that the Labor Board's order
against All American was within the boundaries of Rule 65(d). 414 U.S. at 180.
25. Id.
26. The Court additionally relied upon the unexplained notion that a successor "may" benefit
from unremedied unfair labor practices. 414 U.S. at 184. This dubious third party beneficiary theory
was downplayed by the Labor Board in Perma Vinyl, where the NLRB acknowledged that a bona
fide successor is "not a party to the unfair labor practices and continues to operate the business
without any connection with [the] predecessor." Perma Vinyl, 164 N.L.R.B. 968, 969 (1967), dis-
cussed infra note 111.
27. The Court did not elaborate on the definition of "privity." See Rendleman, supra note 18 at
879-80 (criticizing "privity" concept as "circular" and "barren").
28. See Barksdale, Successor Liability Under the National Labor Relations Act and Title VII, 54
TEx. L. REV. 707, 715 (1976) ("[A]nyone who purchases products or services... would conceivably
satisfy the privity requirement ... ").
29. Golden State, 414 U.S. at 180-81.
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State and was not named in the Labor Board's order issued against
Golden State, except as an unspecified "successor." Moreover, it would
have been flatly inequitable to bootstrap All American's role as a volun-
tary participant in the back pay proceeding into one as a "party to the
action" within Rule 65(d). At most, then, All American could be said to
have received an opportunity to contest its status as a surety for an al-
ready determined liability. 3
0
B. Statutory Authority of the NLRB
Equally deficient is the Golden State Court's treatment of the statutory
limitations on the NLRB's remedial authority. Section 10(c) of the
NLRA delegates broad remedial discretion to the NLRB but limits its
application to the "person named in the complaint. 31  It also provides
for an award of back pay from "the employer ... responsible for the
discrimination suffered."' 32 Under these standards, the NLRB could not
reach All American: All American was named in the supplemental back
30. Professor Rendleman does not explain why notice alone renders an independent purchaser
an "obligor" as a "named party" under Rule 65(d). Rendleman, supra note 18, at 891. "Common
sense" may require a purchaser to assume all the liabilities of the seller. Id. This requirement must
still survive due process principles embodied in the Constitution and Rule 65(d).
Rule 65(d) also reflects common law limitations upon third party liability. These limitations pro-
vide that assets purchasers do not assume a seller's liabilities absent collusion, evasion, or assent. See
Leannais v. Cincinnati, Inc., 565 F.2d 437, 440 (7th Cir. 1977) (Wisconsin law precludes strict liabil-
ity for injury from seller's manufacturing defects); 15 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF
PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 7122 (rev. perm. ed. 1983). These principles have not been abolished by
the NLRA or by amendment to Rule 65(d).
Professor Rendleman also assumes erroneously that All American had "an opportunity to be
heard at the unfair labor practice hearing." Rendleman, supra note 18, at 891. In fact, this hearing
antedated the date of sale by five years.
An alternative interpretation for the Golden State holding is an in rem concept that assumes the
property sold to All American is "infected" with the unremedied unfair labor practice and any
independent purchaser of this "locus" with knowledge of the "infection" takes this property interest
bound by this "lien." This on-going property interest theory, however, does not fit within the Rule
65(d) categories. This interpretation has been applied in patent infringement injunctions. E.g., Her-
rlein v. Kanakis, 526 F.2d 252, 255 (7th Cir. 1975).
31. 29 U.S.C.A. § 160(c) (West Supp. 1988).
32. Section 10(c) provides:
If... the Board shall be of the opinion that any person named in the complaint has engaged
in or is engaging in any such unfair labor practice, then the Board... shall issue and cause
to be served on such person an order requiring such person to cease and desist from such
unfair labor practice, and to take such affirmative action including reinstatement of em-
ployees with or without back pay.... Where an order directs reinstatement of an em-
ployee, back pay may be required of the employer ... responsible for the discrimination
suffered....
Id. (emphasis added).
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pay specification, but was not named in the complaint and was not the
employer responsible for the unlawful discrimination against Baker. Yet
instead of directly addressing this statutory language, the Court looked
again to Regal Knitwear, a decision wholly unconcerned with section
10(c). There, the Court remarked in passing that an ownership transfer
can be performed either as a means of evading the judgment or "for other
reasons."33 The Court in Golden State interpreted this phrase as approv-
ing extension of the Labor Board's remedial authority under the NLRA
to reach innocent transferees.34 In the aftermath of this sweeping deci-
sion, it is hardly surprising that new owners face remedial obligations
under an increasing variety of regulatory statutes without legislative
sanction.
III. DEVELOPMENT OF SUCCESSOR LIABILITY UNDER NLRA
A. Collective Bargaining Obligations
Whenever an ownership transfer involves a union-organized seller, the
successor doctrine creates increased labor costs for the buyer arising
from the seller's collective bargaining agreement. The transfer of these
seller's unassumed contractual obligations to the new owner burdens and
even eliminates the buyer's managerial discretion to alter operations and
modify terms and conditions of employment, and may delay or frustrate
the sale itself. The Supreme Court's exalted endorsement of arbitration
as the highroad to peaceful resolution of industrial strife36 underlies the
Court's willingness to impose on the new owner the seller's promise to
arbitrate employee grievances when the change of ownership occurs
before the expiration of the seller's collective bargaining agreement.
This, in turn, has led federal judges and arbitrators to require that suc-
cessors adhere to the entire contract based upon contractual clauses
binding the seller's successors and assigns. It has even led to suits to
33. Regal Knitwear, 324 U.S. at 14-15 (emphasis added).
34. Golden State, 414 U.S. at 175-77 (citing Regal Knitwear). See also Barksdale, supra note 28,
at 713 ("the Court's disingenuous reliance on Regal Knitwear represents at least a major extension of
the case.").
35. See, eg., Oner II, Inc., v. EPA, 597 F.2d 184, 186-87 (9th Cir. 1979) (purchaser liable for
$20,600 fine against seller for violating the Insecticides and Environmental Pesticide Control Act, 7
U.S.C. §§ 136-136w (1980), citing Golden State, 414 U.S. 168 (1973)); Ray v. Alad, 19 Cal.3d 22, 30,
560 P.2d 3, 8, 136 Cal. Rptr. 574, 579 (1977) (successor liable for seller's product liabilities, citing
Golden State). See also Doe, Corporate Strategic Reaction to Mass Tort, 72 VA. L. REV. 1, 31 n.86
(1986).
36. The Steelworker Trilogy, 363 U.S. 564 (1960); 363 U.S. 574 (1960); 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
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compel compliance with arbitration awards imposed against the seller.
As shown below, the increasing emphasis upon survivability of contrac-
tual rights has steadily diluted the necessity of a successor's assent to
assume the seller's contract liabilities.
The creation of the Supreme Court's successorship doctrine began in
John Wiley & Sons v. Livingston 37 where "substantial continuity of iden-
tity"38 after the merger bound a nonconsenting new owner to the seller's
contractual promise to arbitrate its employee grievances, notwithstand-
ing the absence of a successors and assigns clause. In Wiley, the union-
ized employer (Interscience) was absorbed by merger into the larger
nonunion firm (Wiley) before the collective bargaining agreement ex-
pired. The union grieved Wiley's refusal to continue contractual benefits
and pension payments for the former Interscience employees retained by
Wiley.
The Court transformed Wiley's decision to continue the same business
with a majority of the former Interscience employees into its "consent"
to be bound by the arbitration clause notwithstanding Wiley's express
refusal to continue to give effect to Interscience's union contract or to
recognize or bargain with the union. This fictional assent to a clause
Wiley had not bargained for enabled the Court to assert that Wiley's
arbitration obligation was not actually imposed by judicial decree.39 The
Court also referred to New York law which holds merged corporations
liable for the debts of a disappearing corporation. 4'
Although the Court remitted to an arbitrator the actual extent of Wi-
ley's unassumed obligations under the Interscience contract, the opinion
acknowledged that a successor could be saddled with the disruptive ef-
fects of different and presumably higher wages and benefits applied to the
former Interscience employees now performing the same tasks alongside
Wiley's employees.41 In addition, the opinion did not suggest that the
arbitrator lacked authority to construe "business continuity" as "assent"
37. 376 U.S. 543 (1964).
38. Id. at 551. The Wiley Court stated that when "lack of any substantial continuity of identity
in the business enterprise before and after a change" exists the purchaser should not be required to
assume the predecessor's liabilities. Id.
39. Id.
40, Id. at 550 n.3. It is unclear whether the Court intended this reference as support for its
conclusion.
41. Id. at 551 n.5. The arbitrator required Wiley to pay six employees a total of $338.00 for
vacation pay accrued between the date of sale and the expiration of Interscience's contract with the
union. Interscience Encyclopedia, Inc., 55 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 210, 225 (1970) (Roberts, Arb.).
1989)
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not just to the predecessor's arbitration clause but also to the entire
contract.42
In William J. Burns International Security Services, Inc. 43 the NLRB
applied its interpretation of Wiley to a refusal-to-bargain complaint aris-
ing under the NLRA.4 In this case Burns replaced Wackenhut as the
contractor providing security services to Lockheed. A collective bargain-
ing agreement between Wackenhut and its guards was in effect at the
time Lockheed awarded the contract to Bums. The record does not dis-
close whether the contract included a successors and assigns clause.
Burns retained twenty-seven of the forty-two guards employed by Wack-
enhut in its new unit of forty-two employees. The union demanded that
Burns honor the unexpired Wackenhut contract. Burns refused and rec-
ognized another union as the exclusive bargaining agent for its guards.
The Labor Board viewed the Wiley decision, which bound a successor
to an unexpired arbitration clause, as necessarily implying "that the col-
lective bargaining agreement itself was binding on the successor. '4  The
Supreme Court unanimously disagreed,46 electing instead to construe
Wiley narrowly as a case arising "against a background of state law that
embodies the general rule that in merger situations the surviving corpo-
ration is liable for the obligations of the disappearing corporation. '4 7
The Burns opinion further qualified Wiley on three unpersuasive
grounds: the cases arose under different provisions of the NLRA;48 no
42. The AFL-CIO urged the Court to adopt the view that the entire contract is binding upon a
new owner who is a stock purchaser. Brief for AFL-CIO at 15, John Wiley & Sons v. Livingston,
376 U.S. 543 (1964). See Benetar, Successorship Liability Under Labor Agreements, 1973 Wis. L.
REv. 1026, 1020-32 (analysis of contractual assumption by successors).
The Supreme Court's refusal to reject this assertion expressly apparently allowed the Labor Board
subsequently to adopt it. See infra note 149.
43. 182 N.L.R.B. 348 (1970), enforced in part William J. Burns Int'l Detective Agency v.
NLRB, 441 F.2d 911 (2d Cir. 1971), aff'd sub noma. NLRB v. Burns Int'l Sec. Set., 406 U.S. 272
(1972).
44. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1982).
45. Brief for the National Labor Relations Board at 10, NLRB v. Burns, 406 U.S. 272 (1972)
(Nos. 71-123; 71-198).
46. Although the Court unanimously agreed on the scope to be given Wiley, four justices dis-
agreed with the majority's finding that Bums was a successor. 406 U.S. 272, 296 (Rehnquiest, J.,
dissenting in part).
47. NLRB v. Bums Int'l Sec. Ser., 406 U.S. 272, 286 (1972). The Court, in a five to four
decision, agreed with the Labor Board that Burns had a duty to bargain with Wackenhut's union.
See infra notes 90-94 and accompanying text.
48. 406 U.S. at 285-86. The opinion also did not justify why some limitation on investor
purchase prerogatives is required by federal labor policy under § 301, but not under § 8(a)(5).
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merger or sale of assets occurred in Burns;4 9 and Wiley involved the fed-
eral policy favoring arbitration,50 unlike Burns where the contractual
agreement under the NLRA depended upon the free play of "economic
realities."51
The Court's disinclination to overrule Wiley coupled with its detailed
focus on the particular transactional facts52 enabled arbitrators to con-
tinue to bind nonconsenting new owners to contractual obligations that
were now placed beyond the Labor Board's powers. 3
Howard Johnson Co. v. Detroit Local Joint Executive Board54
presented the Court with an opportunity to harmonize Burns with Wiley
or to overrule one opinion or the other. As in Wiley, the union brought
its cause of action under section 301 and sought to compel Howard John-
son to arbitrate the extent of its obligations to the seller's union under an
unexpired collective bargaining agreement. Moreover, the contract in-
cluded a successors and assigns clause requiring contract adoption by the
buyer.
The Court, however, declined to decide whether Burns and Wiley were
"irreconcilable," 5 5 and elected to further limit Wiley by attaching unex-
plained significance to transactional distinctions in its "substantial con-
tinuity of identity"5 6 analysis. Howard Johnson involved a sale of assets
49, 406 U.S. at 286. The Court did not explain satisfactorily why the form of ownership trans-
action is relevant to its analysis under the majority's employee continuity formulation where both
Wiley and Bums hired a sufficient number of their predecessors' employees to be "successors" under
federal labor policy.
50. The Court created this policy in The Steelworker Trilogy, 363 U.S. 564 (1960); 363 U.S.
574 (1960); 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
51. 406 U.S. at 288. The opinion is silent on why Burns was entitled to the opportunity to put
the union to this "reality" test but Wiley was not.
52. Id. at 274-77.
53. See, e.g., United Steelworkers of America v. United States Gypsum Co., 492 F.2d 713, 725-
27 (5th Cir. 1974) (Burns does not also deny arbitrators latitude to determine "extent to which the
predecessor's labor agreement should be deemed binding on the successor"), enforcing United States
Gypsum Co., 56 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 363 (1971) (Valtin, Arb.) (requiring contract adoption), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 998 (1974). See also ABA Diesel Parts & Service Co., 62 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 660, 666
(1974) (Harter, Arb.) (new owner required to credit service with predecessor in determining vacation
periods where all predecessor's employees hired and new owner agreed to adopt "same terms" as
predecessor's contract, citing Perma Vinyl); Elesco Smelting Corp., 56 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1256 (1971)
(Sembower, Arb.) (new owner bound by predecessor's practice of paying employees Christmas bo-
nuses despite lack of knowledge where new owner made no other modifications in the predecessor's
terms and conditions of employment).
54. 417 U.S. 249 (1974).
55. Id. at 256.
56. See supra note 38.
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where after the sale the seller continued as an entity and could still be
reached to satisfy labor law obligations.5 7 In contrast, Wiley involved
both a predecessor who disappeared after the merger and a state law
requiring that the surviving corporation assume unsatisfied liabilities.5"
The Court elevated the significance of Howard Johnson's decision to hire
a small number of the predecessor's employees to an analytical status
sufficient to dissipate any employee continuity expectations implicit in
the successors and assigns clause.59 The Court also shifted the liability
focus to the seller without explaining how the seller's breach of the suc-
cessors clause or satisfaction of liabilities might affect the status of the
sale or the new owner's remedial obligations.60 Finally, the Court's pol-
icy rationale for reversing Howard Johnson's arbitration obligation was
reduced to the "circumstances of this case."'61
This narrow factual emphasis and the Court's omission of any refer-
ence to an arbitrator's authority to impose specific contractual obliga-
tions upon new owners have allowed lower courts to breathe continuing
life into Wiley. 62 In turn, upon court referral, arbitrators have continued
to impose substantive contractual obligations upon new owners who con-
tinue the seller's business with bargaining units consisting of a majority
of the seller's employees. 63 In addition, labor organizations have aggres-
sively followed Justice Marshall's suggestion in Howard Johnson that
57. Id. at 257.
58. See supra notes 37-40 and accompanying text.
59. 417 U.S. at 258 n.3. Ofcourse, Wiley did not know when it retained Interscience's employ-
ees that this hiring decision would nullify its express liability disclaimer.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 262 n.9.
62. See Boeing Co. v. Machinists, 504 F.2d 307 (5th Cir.) (Wiley survives Burns), cert. denied,
421 U.S. 913 (1974); Carter v. CMTA Molders & Allied Workers, 489 F. Supp. 704, 709 (N.D. Cal.
1980) (same); Local 1529, Food and Commercial Workers v. Chambers Big Star, 124 L.R.R.M.
(BNA) 2120 (W.D. Tenn. June 17, 1986) (new owner's obligation to arbitrate extent of contract
obligations remains after Howard Johnson); Local 1115, Joint Bd. Nursing Home v. B & K Invest-
ments, 436 F. Supp. 1203, 1209 (S.D. Fla. 1977) (same). Cf. Hospital Workers Local 250 v. Pasa-
tiempo Dev. Corp., 627 F.2d 1011 (9th Cir. 1980) (no duty to arbitrate under expired contract when
grievance arose after sale).
63. See, e.g., Consolidation Coal Co., 90 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 952 (1988) (Stoltenberg, Arb.) (suc-
cessor bound by predecessor's past practices); Arch of West Virginia, 90 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 891
(1988) (Stoltenberg, Arb.) (same); Schneiers Finer Foods, Inc., 72 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 881 (1979)
(Belkin, Arb.) (new owner with notice of predecessor's successors and assigns clause bound by
seller's contract despite express disclaimer of any such obligations, B & K Investments, Inc., 71 Lab.
Arb. (BNA) 366, 368 (1978) (Turkus, Arb.) (successor bound by predecessor's contract). Cf.
Pinkertons, Inc., 89 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 917, 920 (1987) (Peterson, Arb.) (successor's liability to hire
certain predecessor employees depends upon extent of hiring authority retained). See generally
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol67/iss2/5
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successors and assigns provisions provide a cause of action against sellers
who transfer ownership without the collective bargaining agreement. 4
Federal courts have repeatedly issued injunctions against such transfers
pending arbitration to determine whether the buyer should assume the
labor contract when the seller breached this provision."
None of the decisions imposing contractual obligations on new owners
even contemplates how an arbitrator acquires jurisdiction over a non-
signatory who had never consented to arbitrate anything with the union
and had expressly declined to assume the seller's contract or its labor
obligations.66 In one case an arbitrator issued an advisory opinion on
Crystal & Brodecki, Are Successors and Assigns Clauses Really Binding?, 38 LAB. L.J. 547, 554-57
(1987).
Absent a purchaser's express written disclaimer of contractual survivability, vague oral represen-
tations regarding continuation of the seller's "terms" will be strictly construed as assent to be bound.
Eg., United Food & Commercial Workers v. Geriatric Center of St. Louis, 543 F. Supp. 340 (E.D.
Mo. 1982); American Petrofina, Inc., 63 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1300 (1975) (Marlatt, Arb.). Cf Culinary
Workers v. Howard Johnson, 535 F.2d 1160 (9th Cir. 1976) (new owner who continued predeces-
sor's operations with former employees not bound by predecessor's contract; at time of acquisition
the purchaser refused to recognize union or be bound by contract); Servicecare Inc., 82 Lab. Arb.
(BNA) 590 (1984) (Talarico, Arb.) (express disclaimer to recognize accrued vacation benefits held
also valid as a disclaimer to recognize accrued sick leave benefits); J.J. O'Donnell Woolens, Inc., 61
Lab. Arb. (BNA) 739 (1972) (Hogan, Arb.) (successor's written refusal to accept accrued benefits
prior to sale held effective).
Arbitrators have declined to bind new owners to their predecessors' contract if they are not "suc-
cessors" because of hiring practices limiting the number of predecessors employees hired, or because
of operational changes, or because the seller's contract has no successors and assigns clause. E.g.,
Kroger Co., 78 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 569 (1981) (Howlett, Arb.); Decatur Herald & Review, Inc., 73
Lab. Arb. (BNA) 745 (1979) (Jones, Arb.); New England Lead Burning Corp., 58 Lab. Arb. (BNA)
1254 (1972) (Keefe, Arb.); Kent Enterprises, Inc., 55 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 777 (1970) (Roberts, Arb.).
See also Smegal v. Gateway Foods of Minneapolis, Inc., 819 F.2d 191 (8th Cir. 1987) (change of
operations); Service Hosp. Employees Union v. Cleveland Tower Hotel, Inc., 606 F.2d 684, 687-88
(6th Cir. 1978) (no continuity of employees); Distillery Workers, Local 19 v. Key Wines & Liquors,
113 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3377 (D.N.J. July 8, 1983) (no duty to arbitrate where new owner hired nine
employees from the seller in new unit of 23).
64. 417 U.S. 249, 258 n.3 (1974).
65. Culinary Workers, Local 226 v. Royal Center, Inc., 754 F.2d 835 (9th Cir. 1985); Machin-
ists, Lodge No. 1266 v. Panoramic Corp., 668 F.2d 276, 287 (7th Cir. 1981); Teamsters Local 961 v.
Graves Truck Line, Inc., 502 F. Supp. 1292 (D. Colo. 1980); Local 1115 v. B & K Investments, 96
L.R.RM. (BNA) 2353 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 10, 1977); Amalgamated Food Employee's Union, Local 590
v. National Tea Co., 346 F. Supp. 875 (W.D. Pa. 1972). Contra Anderson v. Ideal Basic Indus., 804
F.2d 950, 953 (6th Cir. 1986) (clause unenforceable against seller). See also Fasman, Labor Rela-
tions, Consequences of Mergers and Acquisitions, 13 EMPLOYEE REV. L.J. 14, n.26 (1987) (collecting
arbitrator's decisions on the binding effect of successors and assigns clauses); Kramer & Schindel,
Bargaining Obligations and Corporate Transformations, in PROCEEDINGS OF N.Y.U. NATIONAL
CONFERENCE ON LABOR 223, 257-59 (R. Adelman, ed. 1980).
66. The Supreme Court has said that an employer's arbitration obligation is not created by
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whether the purchaser could be bound by the seller's contract because
the purchaser was not a signatory to the seller's arbitration provision.
67
Constrained by a judicial decree ordering arbitration, the arbitrator con-
cluded the new owner was not a "legal" successor.6s It is unclear how a
contrary award would have been enforceable. In any event, few new
owners have challenged the arbitrator's authority to determine their con-
tractual obligations absent their consent to arbitration.
The Supreme Court's abiding faith in arbitration ironically so far has
frustrated union efforts to require successors to abide by arbitration
awards issued against their predecessors. In Shaffer v. Mitchell Trans-
port, Inc. 69 Martin Trucking was party to a collective bargaining agree-
ment that limited the number of employee-drivers used to preserve
hauling work for owner-drivers. An arbitration committee ordered Mar-
tin to comply with this portion of the contract. Thereafter, Martin sold
its hauling company to Mitchell. Mitchell agreed "to assume the terms
and obligations of [Martin] under the Collective Bargaining Agree-
ments."7 After the sale, the union obtained a $172,833 award against
Martin for its breach of the work preservation clause and then sought to
enforce the award against Mitchell. The lower court agreed that Mitch-
ell was bound by the award, rejecting Mitchell's claim that the question
of whether Mitchell was bound by the award was arbitrable.71
The Third Circuit vacated the district court's order72 on the plausible
theory that the committee's liability award was distinct from the merits
award. 73 The court cited the Steelworkers Trilogy policy favoring arbi-
tration in support of its remand, but distinguished Golden State on the
irrelevant ground that the arbitration committee award in Shaffer did not
contain a successorship clause.74 The court should have deemed this
omission from the award meaningless, however, because 1) an arbitrator
has no authority to bind any nonconsenting entity (including the buyer)
to the award, and 2) such an inquiry is not pertinent to the traditional
federal law, but by voluntary agreement. Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., 363
U.S. 574, 582 (1960).
67. Kroger Co., 78 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 569, 578 (1981) (Howlett, Arb.).
68. Id. at 591.
69. 635 F.2d 261 (3d Cir. 1980).
70. Id. at 263.
71. Id. at 262.
72. Id. at 267 (vacated and remanded to district court with directions to stay proceedings pend-
ing arbitration).
73. Id. at 264-65.
74. Id. at 264-65, 266-67.
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successorship inquiry performed by courts. Instead, the court should
have considered whether the collective bargaining agreement contained a
successorship clause, and why Mitchell's express assumption of all of
Martin's collective bargaining obligations did not also include the arbi-
tration award against Martin, particularly because the award "is actually
a vehicle by which meaning and content are given to the collective bar-
gaining agreement."75 Thus, in this context, Mitchell's assent to Mar-
tin's collective bargaining obligations eliminated the distinction, initially
drawn by the court, between the merits and liability proceedings. Ulti-
mately, the court simply considered the district court's remedial obliga-
tion to "go far beyond what has previously been accomplished under the
successorship doctrine."76
While the court correctly concluded that the lower court's opinion was
unprecedented, the operative facts seem to fall well within the existing
successorship doctrine because of Mitchell's express agreement to assume
Martin's contractual obligations. Because Mitchell agreed to be bound
by the contract and because the award against Martin became part of the
obligation established by the contract, the court unnecessarily raised the
issue of Mitchell's knowledge of the award. As Mitchell accepted the
contractual obligations without reservation, the court should have deter-
mined that Mitchell accepted the obligation from the award as part and
parcel of the same bundle of obligations.
Only one relevant question remained: whether Mitchell was Martin's
"successor." On the facts set forth by the court, no other conclusion was
supportable. The court's misperception of the effect of an arbitration
award upon continuing collective bargaining obligations, and its unduly
restrictive view of Golden State, makes it unlikely that this opinion will
continue to shelter successors from arbitration awards issued against
their predecessors, particularly where the buyer expressly agrees to as-
sume the seller's contract obligations without limitation.
B. The Duty to Bargain
Beginning in 1937, the Labor Board adopted a policy of directing its
orders against the violator's successors and assigns regardless of any im-
pending or actual change of ownership. 77 The Labor Board's first oppor-
75. United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Nav. Co., 363 U.S. 574, 581 (1960).
76. Shaffer, 635 F.2d at 267.
77. Hill Bus Co., 2 N.L.R.B. 781, 800 (1937).
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tunity to apply a "successor" order against a new owner occurred in
South Carolina Granite.7 Blair Quarries acquired South Carolina Gran-
ite's quarry and crushing plant by lease and continued the same opera-
tion without hiatus using the same workforce under the same
supervisors. The Labor Board labeled Blair Quarries a "successor" to
South Carolina Granite to create a sufficient link between the two "em-
ploying industries" to establish Blair's statutory obligations to recognize
and bargain with the labor organization that had organized South Caro-
lina Granite's employees. 79 According to the Labor Board, Blair's fail-
ure as a successor to South Carolina Granite to accord recognition to the
union constituted an unlawful refusal to bargain under the NLRA. °
Subsequently, the Labor Board extended the concept of successorship
to transactions in which the seller continued in existence after the sale,8 '
and where only limited assets were purchased by the new owner.8 2 Fol-
lowing South Carolina Granite, the Labor Board based its bargaining or-
ders on factual findings that a majority of the successor's employees
formerly worked for the predecessor. If these employees performed es-
sentially the same work under similar working conditions, the Labor
Board then inferred that the successor's employees continued to regard
the predecessor's union "as a congenial and effective representative,18 3
despite the change of ownership.
For a brief period beginning in 1963 with Stepp's Friendly Ford,84 the
Labor Board modified the prerequisite finding that a "majority" of the
successor's workforce consists of the predecessor's employees to a "sub-
stantially" the same workforce standard. On review, the Ninth Circuit
78. 58 N.L.R.B. 1448 (1944), enforced sub nom. NLRB v. Blair Quarries, 152 F.2d 25 (4th Cir.
1945). The Labor Board rejected the General Counsel's contentions that the new employer was
merely South Carolina Granite's alter ego and that the transaction had been undertaken to evade
existing remedial obligations. 58 N.L.R.B. at 1465.
79. 58 N.L.R.B. at 1464-65. The Labor Board borrowed the "employing industry" concept
from NLRB v. Colten, 105 F.2d 179 (6th Cir. 1939), a case involving a challenge to the enforceabil-
ity of a Board order against an executrix.
80. 58 N.L.R.B. at 1468. For the statutory source of "refusal to bargain," see National Labor
Relations Act § 8(a)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1982).
81. Allan W. Fleming, Inc., 91 N.L.R.B. 612 (1950).
82. Cruse Motors, Inc., 105 N.L.R.B. 242 (1953). See also Motor City Dodge, Inc., 185
N.L.R.B. 629 (1970).
83. R. GORMAN, BASIC TEXT, UNIONIZATION AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING LABOR LAW
118 (1976).
84. 141 N.L.R.B. 1065 (1963).
85. Id. See also Maintenance, Inc., 148 N.L.R.B. 1299, 1301 (1964) ("[t]he critical question is
... whether [the new owner] continued essentially the same operation, with substantially the same
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reversed the Labor Board's successorship finding, 6 and the NLRB ac-
quiesced 7 and returned its focus to whether a majority of the employee
composition in the new employer's bargaining unit contained employees
who formerly worked for the predecessor as the necessary prerequisite to
inferring a bargaining obligation after a transfer of ownership.88
Concurrently, the Labor Board converted the successor's bargaining
obligation where transfers involved unionized predecessors into a prohi-
bition against unilateral changes in terms and conditions of employment.
The Labor Board further imposed a requirement that the new owner re-
tain the predecessor's employees and refrain from any terminations with-
out prior agreement by the union.8 9
In NLRB v. Burns' the Supreme Court addressed the Labor Board's
evolving successorship principles that extended and enforced union rec-
ognition and bargaining obligation to unconsenting new owners after
transfers of ownership. First, the Court agreed that a wholesale duty to
bargain can be transferred to a new owner by operation of law, despite an
express disclaimer, whenever a "continuity of the business enterprise"
exists, and a majority of the new owner's workforce consists of employees
formerly employed by the predecessor. 9 The Court emphasized that the
award of Lockheed's contract to Burns in place of Wackenhut occurred
employee unit .... ) (dicta) (90% of the new employer's workforce consisted of employees who
formerly worked for the predecessor).
86. NLRB v. Stepp's Friendly Ford, 338 F.2d 833, 836 (9th Cir. 1964), rev'g 141 N.L.R.B.
1065 (1963). The Ninth Circuit refused to find successorship because the new employer's comple-
ment of eight salesmen contained only three previously employed by the seller, even though the
court agreed with the Board that the new employer continued the same operation at the same loca-
tion with substantially the same supervisors. The court also noted that the new employer had hired
only three of the twelve salesmen employed by the predecessor immediately prior to the transfer of
ownership. Id. at 836.
87. Tallakson Ford, Inc., 171 N.L.R.B. 503 (1968) (citing the Ninth Circuit's Stepp's Friendly
Ford opinion with apparent approval). See also Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co., 176 N.L.R.B. 1025, 1026
n.6 (1969) (rejecting alternative suggestion in Stepps Friendly Ford that the alleged successor must
also hire a majority of the employees formerly employed by the predecessor), remanded on petition
for enforcement, 435 F.2d 848 (5th Cir. 1970).
88. See, e.g., Plant & Field Serv. Corp., 184 N.L.R.B. 849 (1970); Joe Robertson & Son, Inc.,
174 N.L.R.B. 1073 (1969); Ellary Lace Corp., 178 N.L.R.B. 73 (1968); Pargament Fidler, Inc., 173
N.L.R.B. 696 (1968); Federal Elec. Corp., 167 N.L.R.B. 469 (1967) (no successor bargaining obliga-
tion where minority of new owner's employees formerly worked for predecessor).
89. Overnite Transp. Co., 157 N.L.R.B. 1185 (1966), enforced, 372 F.2d 765, 768 (4th Cir.),
cert denied, 389 U.S. 838 (1967); Chemrock Corp., 151 N.L.R.B. 1074 (1965).
90. 406 U.S. 272 (1972).
91. Id. at 279, 281 ("if a majority of employees after the change of ownership or management
were employed by the preceding employer"; "majority of the employees hired by the new employer
are represented by a recently certified bargaining agent").
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within four months of the certification of representative status to Wack-
enhut's union. Burns could not have reasonably believed that the union
no longer enjoyed majority support after such a short time. In the ab-
sence of a change in employer, there is "an almost conclusive presump-
tion that the majority representative status of the union continues for a
reasonable time, usually a year."9 2 Thus, the successor's duty to bargain
extends for the same duration (the certification year) required of the
predecessor, as if no transfer had occurred.
The Court, however, rejected the Labor Board's opinion as to when
the successor's duty to bargain attaches. In the Court's view, the duty
commences only after a majority of the new owner's workforce is com-
posed of employees who formerly worked for the predecessor. Prior to
this time, the new owner is free to alter the predecessor's status quo by
offering new terms and conditions of employment.93 The Court also sug-
gested that the duty to bargain might not attach until the new owner had
hired a full complement of employees, rather than as of the date the new
owner commenced operations.94
After Burns, the Labor Board attempted to circumvent the "full com-
plement" dictum to minimize the circumstances in which a union recog-
nition demand upon a new owner could be deemed premature and
therefore lawfully deniable. First, the Labor Board borrowed the "repre-
sentative complement" doctrine from representation election law.95 As
applied to transfers of ownership, once the new owner has hired a repre-
sentative rather than a full complement of employees, the new owner
becomes a successor with a duty to bargain with the predecessor's union
if a majority of the "representative complement" formerly worked for the
predecessor.96 In addition, the Labor Board created the "continuing de-
mand" theory to activate a bargaining obligation whenever a new
owner's increasing work force is composed, no matter how momentarily,
of a majority of employees who had worked for the seller.97 Through
92. Id. at 279 & n.3.
93. Id. at 294-95. In so holding the Court implicitly repudiated the restraints imposed upon
these prerogatives by Overnite Transp., 157 N.L.R.B. 1185 (1966) and Chemrock Corp., 151
N.L.R.B. 1074 (1965). See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
94. Id. at 295 (dictum).
95. See Endicott Johnson De Puerto Rico, 172 N.L.R.B. 1676 (1968) (election may be held
where employer's prospective bargaining unit has a representative rather than a full complement of
eligible voters).
96. See, eg., id.
97. E.g., NLRB v. Jeffries Lithograph Co., 752 F.2d 459 (9th Cir. 1985); Premium Foods, Inc.
v. NLRB, 709 F.2d 623 (9th Cir. 1983); NLRB v. Hudson River Aggregates, 639 F.2d 865 (2d Cir.
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these prescriptions the Labor Board placed new restraints on a pur-
chaser's freedom to exercise its prerogatives, established by Burns, to hire
its own workforce and establish its own initial conditions of employment.
The validity of the Labor Board's deflation of Burns came before the
Supreme Court in Fall River.98
Seven months after the unionized predecessor ceased operations, Fall
River purchased certain existing equipment and inventory at a creditor's
auction. Fall River then hired the first twenty-one of its anticipated em-
ployee complement as a "start-up" crew to repair and clean machinery at
a leased building used by the predecessor. Eighteen of these twenty-one
employees had been employed by the predecessor. Four months later
Fall River hired its first shift of fifty-five employees, thirty-six of whom
formerly worked for the predecessor. Within three months thereafter
Fall River fully staffed a two-shift workforce of one hundred and six em-
ployees, in which the predecessor's employees were a minority. The fol-
lowing month, through employee-circulated petitions, eighty-nine of the
one hundred and six employees disclaimed interest in continuing repre-
sentation by the union.
Under the "substantial and representative complement" theory, the
Labor Board was able to select the date when the first shift (fifty-five of
the one hundred and six) was hired as the appropriate point in Fall
River's hiring process to ascertain work force continuity. This was the
last time in the hiring process that the new unit consisted of a majority of
the predecessor's employees. Further, although the union's one bargain-
ing demand upon Fall River was premature and was lawfully denied be-
cause it was made when only the start-up crew had been hired, the Labor
Board converted this single request into a "continuing" demand that be-
came operative when the first shift began operations four months later.
Finally, the Labor Board presumed that the thirty-six of the fifty-five first
shift employees, who had been represented by the union while in the
predecessor's employ, continued to desire the same union representation
solely because they had been employed in a union-represented bargaining
unit. Because the petitions that disclaimed union representation post-
1981); Saks & Co. v. NLRB, 634 F.2d 681 (2d Cir. 1980); NLRB v. Pre-engineering Bldg. Prod.,
Inc., 603 F.2d 134 (10th Cir. 1979); Pacific Hide & Fur Depot, Inc. v. NLRB, 553 F.2d 609 (9th Cir.
1977); Indianapolis Mack Sales, 272 N.L.R.B. 690 (1984), enfore. denied, 802 F.2d 280 (7th Cir.
1986); Aircraft Magnesium, 265 N.L.R.B. 1344, 1345 n.9 (1982), enforced, 730 F.2d 767 (9th Cir.
1984); Spruce Up Corp., 209 N.L.R.B. 194, 197 (1974), enforced sub nom. NLRB v. Spruce Up
Corp., 529 F.2d 516 (4th Cir. 1975).
98. Fall River Dyeing & Finishing Corp. v. NLRB, 482 U.S. 27 (1987).
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dated the hiring of the first shift-the date on which the Labor Board
established Fall River's bargaining obligation-the Labor Board simply
ignored them. Neither the union nor the Labor Board's General Counsel
alleged that Fall River's hiring decisions were unlawful or
discriminatory.
In upholding the illegality of Fall River's refusal to bargain, the
Supreme Court modified Burns in two significant respects. First, the ma-
jority said that its reference in Burns to "full employee complement" was
not intended to establish the moment when the new owner's duty to bar-
gain attaches. 9 This modification of Burns allowed the Court to endorse
the "substantial and representative complement" standard rationalized
on the assumed and unexamined "interest" of the predecessor's employ-
ees hired by Fall River (who had actually expressed their rejection of the
union) in quickly reestablishing union representation." ° This retrench-
ment of Burns was particularly consequential because under the full com-
plement standard Fall River would not have been a "successor" because
the predecessor's employees were a minority in Fall River's unit and had
been a minority as of the date the full employee complement was hired.
Second, the Court disconnected the inference of continuing union sup-
port in the successor's unit from the requirement of a recent union certifi-
cation."10 This dashed expectations that the new owner's duty to bargain
would be limited to circumstances evidencing a reliable basis for presum-
ing majority status. Consequently, this authorized the Labor Board to
continue to draw broad inferences of continuing union support under the
guise of fostering "industrial peace." ''2 This holding also obviated the
need to assess the effect of an operational hiatus upon future or continu-
ing employment expectations or to ascertain whether any of the employ-
ees in the new owner's employ viewed the seller's union as an "effective
and congenial" representative.
The Court also shifted the focus of the successorship doctrine dramati-
cally away from the Burns business transferability considerations solely
to the employee's view of job continuity.103 This myopic focus, however,
disregards operational modifications which are as much a measure of
99. 482 U.S. at 47-48 n.14.
100. Id. at 48-49.
101. Id. at 41.
102. Id. at 39 ("We now hold that a successor's obligation to bargain is not limited to a situation
where the union in question has been recently certified").
103. Id. at 44. ("[Flrom the perspective of the employees, their jobs did not change.").
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"continuity" as comparative job descriptions. The Court also freed a
union from any initial requirement of tying its bargaining demand to a
new unit that has even a "representative complement" of employees
whom the union represented. Now, in transfers of ownership involving
unionized sellers, the seller's union need not reassert its bargaining claim
even when it has been lawfully refused by the new owner. 104
Without so acknowledging, the Court significantly undermined the
continuing validity of Burns and its cursory analysis failed to seriously
scrutinize Labor Board-created doctrines designed to facilitate facile ra-
tionalizations for sanctioning union bargaining demands without even a
probability that the seller's employees as a unit had any "expectation" of
continuing employment or any consideration of the actual union repre-
sentation desires of Fall River's full employee complement.105 The Court
also substituted a vague "continuity" standard for the functional and
predictable "full employee" complement measure in its determination of
whether the buyer's unit is composed of a majority of employees who
formerly worked for the seller. The "representative complement" mea-
sure places unlimited discretion upon after-the-fact-finders to pick any
point in the new owner's hiring process and create a bargaining
obligation.
IV. GOLDEN STATE BOTTLING AS A CATALYST
TO KNOWN LIABILITIES
A. The Obligation to Remedy Unfair Labor Practices
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Golden State, the Labor
Board and the federal courts employed a cautious approach to imposing
liability on successors to avoid inflicting any hardship or burden upon an
innocent party."6 Thus, the Labor Board carefully tailored the succes-
sor's reinstatement obligation to apply only when current vacancies ex-
isted' 017 and its backpay obligation to commence five days after the
104. Id. at 52-53.
105. George, Successorship and the Duty to Bargain, 63 N.D. L. REv. 277, 280 (1988) ("no real
evidence that the assumptions made have any connection with the reality of employee's desires").
106. See Northern Virginia Sun Publishing Co., 159 N.L.R.B. 1634 (1966), aff'd sub nom.
Wheeler v. NLRB, 382 F.2d 172 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (no reinstatement obligation). See also Tri State
Maintenance Corp., 167 N.L.R.B. 933 (1967), aff'd as modified, 408 F.2d 171 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (no
obligation to hire predecessor's employees).
107. Thomas Engine Corp. & Upshur Engine Co., 179 N.R.L.B. 1029 (1970) (NLRB's order of
immediate reinstatement enforceable only if current vacancy exists; if none, then place employee on
preferential hiring list), aff'd sub non. UAW v. NLRB, 442 F.2d 1180 (9th Cir. 1971).
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discriminatees affirmatively requested employment with the successor. 0 8
Also, the Labor Board declined to order bargaining where there was no
evidence that a majority of the successor's employees had indicated any
support for the predecessor's union. 10 9 The Labor Board's first attempt
to require that a successor recognize a union based solely on union au-
thorization cards presented to the predecessor was denied judicial en-
forcement.1 0 In this posture, a new owner who met the successor
criteria could be certain its innocence would be recognized and that its
obligations arising from the seller's unfair labor practices would be fash-
ioned in recognition of this status.
Since Supreme Court approval of the Perma Vinyl doctrine"' in
Golden State, the NLRB's consideration for successors with clean hands
has been replaced by an aggressive compliance policy which considers
the successor and the violator in pari delicto. Thus, bona fide successors
are now required to offer immediate reinstatement to employees unlaw-
fully discharged by their predecessors without regard to existing vacan-
cies or the hardship to displaced employees in the successor's workforce,
and to pay backpay compensation from the date of the discharge by the
predecessor to the date of reinstatement." 2 In only one reported case,
Bellingham Frozen Foods, Inc. v. NLRB I 3 has a court denied enforce-
108. 179 N.L.R.B. at 1029.
109. Id. See also Southland Mfg. Co., 186 N.R.L.B. 792 (1970) (new election ordered), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 858 (1973); Emerson Elec. Co., 176 N'.L.R.B. 744 (1969) (initial bargaining order
against successor denied).
110. Webb Tractor & Equip. Co., 181 N.L.R.B. 230 (1970), enforcement denied sub nom. NLRB
v. Inland Mach. Co., 80 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2738 (9th Cir. May 11, 1972) (per curiam) (ordering new
election).
11. In Perma Vinyl, 164 N.L.R.B. 968 (1967), enforced sub. nom. United States Pipe & Foun-
dry Co. v. N.L.R.B., 398 F.2d 544 (5th Cir. 1968), the Labor Board stated that a new owner who
acquired a business with unremedied unfair labor practices should be required to remedy those prac-
tices provided it had notice of its predecessor's practices. This liability results from a balancing of
the equities involved; the new employer is in the best position to effectively remedy the practice (and
to reflect that practice in the purchase price), and the predecessor's employees must be assured of
their statutory rights under the NLRA. Id. at 969 (footnotes omitted).
112. See, eg., NLRB v. South Harlan Coal, Inc., 844 F.2d 380, 387 (6th Cir. 1988); Evans
Services, Inc. v. NLRB, 810 F.2d 1089, 1094 (11th Cir. 1987); NLRB v. Hot Bagels and Donuts, 622
F.2d 1113, 1116 (2d Cir. 1980); NLRB v. East Side Shopper, Inc., 498 F.2d 1334, 1336 (6th Cir.
1974); Signal Communications, Inc., 284 N.L.R.B. No. 54, 126 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1355 (June 22,
1987); St. Marys Foundry Co., 284 N.L.R.B. No. 30, 125 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1146 (June 12, 1987),
enforced sub nom. NLRB v. St. Marys Foundry Co., 860 F.2d 679 (6th Cir. 1988); Martin J. Barry
Co., 278 N.L.R.B. 393 (1986); Petros Coal Corp., 257 N.L.R.B. 282 (1981); The Bell Co. Inc., 243
N.L.R.B. 977 (1979); Am-Del-Co., Inc., 234 N.L.R.B. 1040 (1978); Mansion House Center Manage-
ment Corp., 208 N.L.R.B. 684 (1974).
113. 626 F.2d 674 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1125 (1981).
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ment of a reinstatement order issued against a bona fide successor. This
occurred not because of any inequity or burden to the innocent successor
or its existing workforce, but because the successor did not hire any of
the discriminatee's fellow employees from the predecessor's bargaining
unit. 114
The Labor Board, with judicial approval, also has ordered successors
to post cease and desist notices for their predecessors' unlawful interroga-
tions of, and discharge threats against, pro-union employees.115 The La-
bor Board also has required successors to accord recognition to their
predecessors' union to remedy the predecessors' previous unlawful with-
drawals of recognition.1 16  In other cases, successors were required to
reinstate unfair labor practice strikers who had been denied reemploy-
ment by their predecessors. These reinstated employees were then in-
cluded in the determination of whether the successors' units consisted of
a majority of the predecessor's employees, thereby bootstrapping the fur-
ther finding that the successor "unlawfully" denied recognition to their
predecessor's unions. 117 In addition, Labor Board orders have required
successors to engage in bargaining with the predecessor's union over the
operational close down effects upon the predecessor's employees, 118 and
to recognize the predecessor's union as a remedy for the predecessor's
refusal to honor an initial Labor Board certification of union representa-
tion of its employees." 9
Where federal circuit courts have affirmed remedial orders that con-
tain the customary "successors and assigns" language, the Labor Board
uses civil contempt petitions against the new owner when the sale or
transfer occurs before the predecessor complies with the court decree is-
sued against it. The federal circuit courts have approved this use of con-
tempt sanctions against an innocent purchaser. Yet imposition of the
114. Id. at 680-81.
115. NLRB v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. of Topeka, 613 F.2d 267, 270, 272 (10th Cir. 1980) (ap-
plying labor law successor principles to stock sale).
116. Westwood Import Co., Inc., 681 F.2d 664, 668-69 (9th Cir. 1982); NLRB v. Winco Petro-
leum Co., 668 F.2d 973, 979 (8th Cir. 1982).
117. NLRB v. Jarm Enterprises, Inc., 785 F.2d 195, 204-05, 205-06 (7th Cir. 1986); NLRB v.
Fabsteel Co. of La., 587 F.2d 689, 691-93, 693-95 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 943 (1979);
Proxy Communications of Manhattan, Inc., 290 N.L.R.B. No. 68, 129 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1175 (July
29, 1988).
118. Big R Distributors, Inc., 280 N.L.R.B. No. 148, 123 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1254 (July 31, 1986).
119. Aquabrom, Div. of Great Lakes Chem. Corp., 280 N.L.R.B. No. 66, 122 L.R.R.M. (BNA)
1331 (June 30, 1986), aff'd on civil contempt, 855 F.2d 1174 (6th Cir. 1988); Mediterranean Diner,
Inc., 279 N.L.R.B. 538, 538-39 (1986).
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sanction has been delayed by a dispute over whether the Labor Board or
a special master must first determine the new owner's successor status. 120
In NLRB v. Cott Corporation,2' the First Circuit denied affirmance of
another Labor Board attempt to enforce an initial bargaining order
against a bona fide successor. The bargaining order was predicated upon
a union authorization card majority tendered two years before the suc-
cessor, Cott, took over the business.' 22 Because the Labor Board elected
to proceed against Cott as an innocent party, the court viewed the rele-
vant inquiry to be whether the unremedied effects of previous unfair la-
bor practices continued, rather than whether Cott's employees continued
to support the union.' 23 Prior to institution of the suit, Cott had volunta-
rily complied with all the obligations imposed upon the violator, Ponn,
except for the union recognition requirement.124 Thus, the only out-
standing violation was Ponn's refusal to recognize the union two years
before the sale to Cott. The court considered this violation fully dissi-
pated because, although Cott's initial employee complement consisted of
a majority of Ponn's employees, only one of Ponn's employees remained
in Cott's employ at the time the Labor Board first demanded it recognize
the union.'25 Significantly, the court, unlike the Ninth Circuit in a previ-
ous decision,' 26 did not unilaterally substitute a rerun election for the
Labor Board's bargaining order.12 7
The unique circumstances of Cott's voluntary compliance with the or-
der issued against Ponn limits the future significance of this precedent.
Essentially, the case stands for the narrow principle that a successor who
acts without compulsion to dissipate the effects of the predecessor's
NLRA violations can, with nearly 100% employee turnover, avoid being
120. NLRB v. FMG Inds., 820 F.2d 289, 294 (9th Cir. 1987); Aquabrom v. NLRB, 746 F.2d
334 (6th Cir. 1984); Computer Sciences Corp. v. NLRB, 677 F.2d 804 (1Ith Cir. 1982).
121. 578 F.2d 892 (1st Cir. 1978).
122. Id. at 893.
123. Id. at 895 n.4.
124. Id. at 893.
125. Id. at 895. The court, however, did not explain why this date was more significant than any
other, or why Cott should profit from its employee turnover after hiring a majority of the predeces-
sor's employees.
The opinion could have been buttressed by analogy to court cases dismissing initial card majority
bargaining orders where Labor Board delay has led to a prolonged period of employee turnover. See
NLRB v. Clark's Gamble Corp., 422 F.2d 845, 847 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 868 (1970).
This policy has even more force when applied in favor of bona fide successors who have not been
asked to recognize the predecessor's union.
126. NLRB v. Inland Mach. Co., 80 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2738, 2738 (9th Cir. May 11, 1972).
127. Cott, 578 F.2d at 896.
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required to recognize and bargain with the predecessor's union. 128
B. Civil Rights Liability
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) readily
grasped the Golden State opinion's potential for extending Title VII 2 9
liability for unfair employment practices. In EEOC v. MacMillan Bloe-
del Containers,'"0 the Sixth Circuit agreed that the NLRA (which by
then provided for successor liability) was the appropriate model for im-
posing such liability. 13  The court enunciated a multifactor test for de-
termining whether the new owner was a "successor" 13 2 and defined the
prerequisite "notice to the successor" as notice of the EEOC charge
against the predecessor prior to the transfer of ownership.1 3 3 The court
further specified that "[the predecessor's] ability to provide relief will be
a necessary inquiry" in determining the successor's remedial
obligations."14
In the aftermath of MacMillan, every federal circuit court that has
considered the matter has approved successor liability under Title VII.
As a result, a successor is now required to pay money damages and attor-
ney's fees, 135 to offer immediate reinstatement to employees terminated
128. The Labor Board has not yet required a successor to make trust fund contributions unlaw-
fully discontinued by the predecessor. See J.P. Sturrus Corp., 288 N.L.R.B. No. 77, 128 L.R.R.M.
(BNA) 1067 (April 26, 1988) (no contribution remedy where successor did not hire all of the prede-
cessor's employees). The Labor Board has also recognized that the Court's decision in H.K. Porter
Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99 (1970), precludes a successor from being required to accept a collective
bargaining agreement unexecuted by the predecessor. Martin J. Barry Co., 278 N.L.R.B. 393
(1986).
129. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1981).
130. 503 F.2d 1086 (6th Cir. 1974).
13L Id. at 1089-93.
132. The MacMillan court found the following nine factors relevant to its determination of
whether a new owner was a "successor" for Title VII liability purposes:
1) whether the successor company had notice of the charge, 2) the ability of the predeces-
sor to provide relief, 3) whether there has been a substantial continuity of business opera-
tions, 4) whether the new employer uses the same plant, 5) whether he uses the same or
substantially the same work force, 6) whether he uses the same or substantially the same
supervisory personnel, 7) whether the same jobs exist under the same working conditions,
8) whether he uses the same machinery, equipment and methods of production and 9)
whether he produces the same product.
Id. at 1094 (citations omitted).
133. Id. at 1093.
134. Id. at 1092.
135. Criswell v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 860 F.2d 1088 (9th Cir. 1988) (ordered published Feb. 28,
1989); In re National Airlines, Inc., 700 F.2d 695, 699 n.5 (lth Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S.
933 (1983); Trujillo v. Longhorn Mfg. Co., Inc., 694 F.2d 221, 224-25 (10th Cir. 1982); Slack v.
Washington University Open Scholarship
402 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 67:375
by the seller, 136 to comply with injunctions and consent decrees issued
against the seller, 137 and to continue the seller's pension and welfare con-
tributions 138 and medical benefits compensation.
1 39
In addition to Title VII, courts have imposed liability on bona fide
successors for their predecessors' violations of the Equal Pay Act, 140 the
Age Discrimination In Employment Act,'' the Pregnancy Discrimina-
tion Act, 2 and the Civil Rights Act of 1866.143
In the main, courts have applied the MacMillan notice requirement
strictly,'" and also have excused the successor who had knowledge of
violations from liability where the predecessor continued in existence af-
ter the sale and therefore remained in a position to provide reinstatement
Havens, 522 F.2d 1091, 1094-95 (9th Cir. 1975); EEOC v. Sage Realty Corp., 507 F. Supp. 599
(S.D.N.Y. 1981). See also Kolosky v. Anchor Hocking Corp., 33 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (DNA) 1185
(W.D. Pa. 1983) (successor liable for injunctive relief and any obligation incurred by predecessor).
136. EEOC v. Oakley-Keesee Ford, 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 850 (W.D. Tenn. 1976);
Escamilla v. Mosher Steel Co., 386 F. Supp. 101 (S.D. Tex. 1975).
137. Criswell v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 860 F.2d 1088 (9th Cir. 1988) (ordered published Feb. 28,
1989); Bates v. Pacific Maritime Ass'n, 744 F.2d 705, 711 (9th Cir. 1984) (consent decree). Cf
Waker v. Republic Steel Corp., 45 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 303 (N.D. Ala. 1987) (successor not
bound by 13 year old consent decree in absence of consent).
138. EEOC v. Sage Realty Corp., 507 F. Supp. 599 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
139. EEOC v. MTC Gear Corp., 595 F. Supp. 712, 716-17 (N.D. Il. 1984).
140. Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1978). Carlton v. Interfaith Medical Center,
612 F. Supp. 118 (E.D.N.Y. 1985).
141. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1982). Criswell v.
Delta Airlines, Inc., 860 F.2d 1088 (9th Cir. 1988) (mem.) (successor obligated to hire predecessor's
second officer pilots over age 60 despite its policy of not hiring pilots over age 60 as second officers).
Bernstein v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 622 F. Supp. 1096 (N.D. Il1. 1984).
142. Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1982). EEOC v. Vucitech,
842 F.2d 936, 944-45 (7th Cir. 1988) (citing Golden State).
143. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1982). Musikiwamba v. ESSL Inc., 760 F.2d 740 (7th Cir. 1985) (reme-
dial not punitive or compensatory); Yolk v. Coler, 845 F.2d 1422 (7th Cir. 1988).
144. Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co., 805 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041-
42 (1987) (no successor liability absent filed or pending charge known prior to date of purchase);
Dominguez v. Hotel, Motel, Restaurant & Misc. Bartenders Union, Local 64, 674 F.2d 732, 733 (8th
Cir. 1982) (no direct or indirect evidence of successor's knowledge of pending discrimination charge
against predecessor); Wiggins v. Spector Freight Systems, Inc., 583 F.2d 882 (6th Cir. 1978) (no
notice of "contingent" discrimination prior to "time of acquisition"); Burt v. Ramada Inn, 507 F.
Supp. 336 (N.D. Miss. 1980), aff'd without opinion, 650 F.2d 281 (5th Cir. 1981) (no knowledge of
charge or of identity of alleged discriminatee prior to acquisition). Cf. Slack v. Havens, 522 F.2d
1091 (9th Cir. 1975) (absence of "technical" notice of EEOC proceedings immaterial where succes-
sor had full opportunity to defend). But see Escamilla v. Mosher Steel Co., 386 F. Supp. 101 (S.D.
Tex. 1975) (successor's opportunity to conciliate EEOC charge after transfer sufficient to create
reinstatement and back pay obligation).
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and financial relief.145
In one significant case the seller did not disclose the possibility of lia-
bility for sex discrimination to the buyer and no common identity of
ownership existed between the parties. The court noted the buyer's ab-
sence of "due diligence" in failing to make an inquiry prior to purchase,
but concluded no successor liability could be imposed absent judicial pre-
cedent or congressional legislation imposing a "due diligence" inquiry
requirement upon prospective buyers. 146
Finally, in borrowing the NLRA "substantial continuity of iden-
tity" 147 successor test, courts have given determinative weight to the
number of the seller's employees hired by the putative successor 148 and
distinguished assets purchases from stock sales149 in applying the
standard. 150
C Mine Safety and Health Liability
The Federal Coal Mine Safety and Health Act broadly protects coal
145. Brown v. Evening News Ass'n, 473 F. Supp. 1242 (E.D. Mich. 1979) (no successor joint or
several liability where violator able to provide substantial relief).
146. Wheeler v. Snyder Buick, Inc., 794 F.2d 1228, 1236-37 (7th Cir. 1986). Barksdale, supra
note 28, at 729 (suggesting purchasers have duty to inquire about the predecessor's civil rights com-
pliance prior to purchase).
147. See supra note 38 for the Supreme Court's original formulation of this test in Wiley. See
also supra note 132 for the MacMillan nine factor successorship test.
148. Forde v. Kee Lox Mfg. Co. Inc., 584 F.2d 4 (2d Cir. 1978) (minority of predecessor's
employees hired, held not to be a "successor"). Cf. EEOC v. Chandelle Club, 506 F. Supp. 75, 77
(W.D. Okla. 1980) (no attorney fees owed new owner where liability claim as "successor" promptly
dismissed by EEOC).
149. After Burns, the Labor Board limited the Court's "no contract adoption" holding to assets
purchasers. E.g., Topinka's Country House, Inc., 235 N.L.R.B. 72 (1978), enf'd, 624 F.2d 770 (6th
Cir. 1980); Western Boot & Shoe, Inc., 205 N.L.R.B. 999 (1973) (stock purchaser obligated to as-
sume existing contract). See Krupman & Kaplan, The Stock Purchaser After Burns: Must He Buy
the Union Contract? 31 LAB. L.J. 328 (1980) (stock purchaser's responsibilities should be no greater
than assets purchaser's). Courts have recognized that both types of purchases can have the same
type of operational and organizational changes with the same consequences upon employees. There-
fore, courts have applied successorship law rather than corporate law in assessing the impact of the
new owner's operational change upon affected employees. See EPE Inc. v. NLRB, 845 F.2d 483,
490 (4th Cir. 1988) (operational changes could preclude "continuity" in stock purchases); NLRB v.
Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. of Topeka, 613 F.2d 267 (10th Cir. 1980); Emanuel, Corporate Acquisitions
. .. The Management Perspective, 10 INDUS. REL. L.J. 66, 73-74 (1988) (whether labor law successor
principles apply to stock sales pending decision before NLRB).
150. Wells v. Continental Baking Co., 43 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1185 (W.D.N.Y. 1987)
(record unclear whether new owner is assets or stock purchaser); Burt v. Ramada Inn, 507 F. Supp.
336 (N.D. Miss. 1980) (purchase without assuming seller's obligations), aff'd without opinion, 650
F.2d 281 (5th Cir. 1981).
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miners and other employees of mine operators from workplace hazards
associated with coal mine accidents and explosions."' The Act delegates
authority to the Department of Labor to promulgate mandatory mine
safety and health standards,1 52 and to enforce these standards via inspec-
tion and citations with civil penalties and mine closure orders."15
Enforcement also depends upon the initiative of individual miners to re-
port standards violations. Accordingly, the Act expressly forbids disci-
pline, discharge, or any form of discrimination against miners who
exercise this reporting and disclosure function." 4 Administrative adjudi-
cation of claims alleging violations of this provision was entrusted in
1977 to the five-member Federal Coal Mine Safety and Health Review
Commission. 155
Within two years of its creation, the Commission discovered the Mac-
Millan decision and, adopting its multiple factor test of successorship,1 56
borrowed its rationale to justify the imposition of affirmative reinstate-
ment, including temporary reinstatement (prior to hearing), back pay,
civil fines, and attorneys' fees on successor operators. 157
A recent case illustrates the application of these principles.158 In early
July 1984, three miners employed by Sugartree Corporation complained
to their foreman about severe coal dust conditions in the mine. When
their complaints went unheeded, they left their jobs. Thereafter, Sugar-
tree laid them off, assertedly because of declining production at the mine.
In September 1984, Sugartree transferred its mining rights permit to
Richland Coal Company which, in turn, transferred operating responsi-
bility to Terco, Inc. Also in September 1984, a Review Commission Ad-
ministrative Law Judge (AL) issued reinstatement orders against
Sugartree requiring the immediate rehiring of the miners pending deci-
sion on the merits. Because Sugartree had dissolved, the miners applied
151. The Coal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1969, as amended, The Federal Mine Safety and
Health Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C. § 801-962 (1982). See generally Nat'l Indep. Coal Operators Ass'n v.
Kleppe, 423 U.S. 388 (1976).
152. 30 U.S.C. §§ 811, 841-878 (1982).
153. Id. §§ 813, 814-821.
154. Id. § 815(c).
155. Id. § 823(a).
156. See supra note 132.
157. Munsey v. Smitty Baker Coal Co., Inc., 2 F.M.S.H.R.C. 3463 (1980), affd without discus-
sion sub nom., Munsey v. Federal Mine Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 701 F.2d 976 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied sub nom., Smitty Baker Coal Co. v. Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Comm'n,
464 U.S. 851 (1983).
158. Corbin v. Sugartree Corporation, 9 F.M.S.H.R.C. 394 (1987).
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to Terco for reinstatement, but without success. Thereafter, the Com-
mission concluded Terco was a "successor" to Sugartree and held Terco
liable for reinstatement of the miners laid off by Sugartree, full back pay
from the date of layoff, and payment of the $1,000 fine assessed against
Sugartree. 159 On Terco's review petition, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the
Commission's affirmative remedial order in full."6
In applying its own MacMillan factors, the Sixth Circuit noted that
Sugartree, as a dissolved corporation after September 1984, was unable
to provide any of the financial or affirmative relief ordered by the Com-
mission."' Although Sugartree ceased operations in September just
prior to the ALJ's temporary reinstatement order, the court inferred
"knowledge" from the fact that the president of Sugartree became presi-
dent of Terco from September until December 1984, a date after the min-
ers had filed their complaints. 162 Because at least fifty percent of Terco's
workforce consisted of miners formerly employed by Sugartree and
Terco continued to produce coal, albeit under a different mining method,
the court agreed Terco was a "successor" to Sugartree. 163 The court re-
jected Terco's contention that because it had not purchased an ongoing
business, it could not be held responsible for Sugartree's violations. In-
stead, the court relied upon the closely linked ownership between Sugar-
tree and Terco to obviate the requirement that a sale is a prerequisite to
application of the successor doctrine. 1
While the Commission decision is limited to the coal industry, the
Sixth Circuit's affirmance broadly assigns complete liability after any
form or manner of transfer that continues the same business with a sub-
stantial number of the violator's employees. This application of MacMil-
lan could widely influence other judicial and administrative decision
makers and further expands the reach of orders against bona fide
successors.
D. Wage and Hour Liability
The Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) requires employers or "enter-
159. Id. at 396.
160. Terco, Inc. v. Federal Mine Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 839 F.2d 236 (6th Cir.
1987), cerL denied, 109 S. Ct. 57 (1988).
161. 839 F.2d at 239.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 239-40.
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prises" engaged in commerce to pay employees a minimum wage and a
premium wage rate above a certain number of hours worked per week. ' 65
The Department of Labor administrates the FLSA and has primary en-
forcement responsibility. 166 Upon investigation, the administrator may
seek injunctive relief to restrain further violations 167 and may file suit to
recover unpaid minimum wages and overtime pay, liquidated damages,
pre- and post-judgment interest, and attorneys' fees. 168 The Act is silent
as to the administrator's authority to proceed against successors of
violators.
Early federal government efforts to extend injunctions to successors
were unsuccessful. 169 However, after Golden State and MacMillan, the
government secured judicial decrees requiring new owners determined to
be "successors" to share joint and several liability with the predecessor
violators for wage payments, compensatory fines including the time
period prior to acquisition, and attorneys' fees. 7 ' In these cases the
courts generally required proof of the established prerequisites-pur-
chaser knowledge prior to takeover and successorship status-before im-
posing joint and several liability on the successor. In one recent case,
however, a federal district court assessed wage and hour compensation
liability on a new owner who did not hire a majority of the violator's
employees. In addition, the court inferred that the new owner had
knowledge before the takeover date on the basis that one former officer of
the violator hired by the new owner "should have known" that a wage
165. Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). See Nordlund, A
Brief History of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 39 LAB. L.J 715 (1988).
166. Id. § 204 (1982).
167. Id. § 217 (1982). See Donovan v. Brown Equip. & Serv. Tools, Inc., 666 F.2d 148, 156-57
(5th Cir. 1982) (explaining equitable objectives of injunctive relief). Injunctive relief is also available
to compel reinstatement and backpay to employees discharged for asserting rights under the Act.
Mitchell v. DeMario Jewelry Co., 361 U.S. 288 (1960).
168. 29 U.S.C. § 216 (1982). See Brooklyn Savings Bank v. O'Neil, 324 U.S. 697 (1944) (liqui-
dated damages); Donovan v. Sovereign Sec., Ltd., 726 F.2d 55, 57 (2d Cir. 1984) (pre- and post-
judgment interest).
169. McComb v. Row River Lumber Co., 177 F.2d 129, 130 (9th Cir. 1949) (emphasizing ab-
sence of due process); Tobin v. Rockett, 19 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 1 66,207 (M.D. Ala. 1950) (innocent
new employer beyond reach of injunction).
170. Donovan v. Maverick Oil Co., 92 Lab. Cas. (CCI-) 34,091 (E.D. Mich. 1981) (citing
MacMillan); Marshall v. Keasling, 82 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 33,562 (E.D. Mich. 1977) (citing Mac-
Millan). Cf. Usery v. Broadway Inn, Inc., 84 Lab. Cas. (CCH) V1 33,709 (W.D. Mo. 1978) (lack of
privity between first successor and violator raises legal question of which successor is obligated to
comply with injunction).
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compensation claim would be filed. 71 This rationale approaches per se
liability by treating a new owner as a surety for the violator where the
new owner is not a successor and lacks any opportunity before the time
of takeover to indemnify itself from unascertainable and unanticipatable
obligations.
E. Veterans Reemployment Rights Liability
In the Selective Service Act of 1948, Congress extended federal reem-
ployment protections for honorably discharged servicemen and women
to "the [former] employer's successor in interest." 17 2 Several federal cir-
cuit courts construed this phrase narrowly to require some identity of
ownership and control between the prior and new employers absent any
contrary statutory definition or legislative history.173 This interpretation
limited a new owner's reemployment obligation to acquisitions by
merger. 174
Recent adaptations of the labor and civil rights successorship princi-
ples discussed above have now expanded the "successor in interest" con-
cept to include bona fide purchasers of assets. Courts assessing liability
under the Veterans Reemployment Rights Act have adopted this broader
definition of "successor," and the greater reach of liability it provides.
For example, in Chaltry v. Ollie's Idea, Inc.,17S the parties stipulated that
no common ownership existed between seller and buyer. 176 Notwith-
standing, the court applied the Sixth Circuit's MacMillan factors 177 and
declared that the purchaser was a successor to the seller, and then im-
posed a $19,000 liability judgment upon the purchaser for the seller's
unlawful refusal to rehire Chaltry. 178
171. Brock v. LaGrange Equip. Co., 28 Wage & Hour Cas. (BNA) 780 (D. Neb. 1987) (citing
Golden State).
172. 38 U.S.C. § 2021(a)(B)(i), (ii) (1982) (current version now entitled Veterans Reemployment
Rights Act). See Rix v. Turnbull-Novak, Inc., 260 F.2d 785, 788 (8th Cir. 1958) (veteran shall be
restored to pre-service position by employer or employer's "successor").
173. Wimberly v. Mission Broadcasting Co., 523 F.2d 1260, 1262 (10th Cir. 1975) (new owners
had no connection with or financial interest in seller); Cox v. Feeders Supply Co., 344 F.2d 924, 925
(6th Cir. 1965) (no connection between former and new owners); Rix v. Turnbull-Novak, Inc., 159
F. Supp. 199, 201 (W.D. Mo. 1958) (absence of common ownership), aff'd on other grounds, 260
F.2d 785 (8th Cir. 1958).
174. Carr v. RCA Rubber Co., 609 F. Supp. 526 (N.D. Ohio 1985); Sullivan v. Milner Hotel
Co., 66 F. Supp. 607, 610 (E.D. Mich. 1946).
175. 546 F. Supp. 44 (W.D. Mich. 1982).
176. Id. at 46.
177. See supra notes 130-134 and accompanying text.
178. 546 F. Supp. at 51-52. Although the court ordered joint and several liability, the seller
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The extension of backpay or reinstatement obligations to successors
under the Veterans Reemployment Rights Act creates difficult issues of
knowledge. Unless the drafted or enlisting employee expresses an inten-
tion to return to the seller's employ before commencing military service,
it is unlikely the new owner will be aware of this potential liability at the
time of a subsequent transfer of ownership. 179 Moreover, the former em-
ployer's obligation to reinstate does not arise until the veteran receives a
certification of honorable discharge and establishes current qualification
to perform his former job. Finally, the veteran has up to ninety days
after discharge from the military to apply for reinstatement. 80
F. State Law Obligations
Ownership transfers also occur against a background of state labor
statutes that supplement or expand the scope of similar federal labor
laws. These statutes regulate intrastate employment relationships and
provide a plethora of rights and remedies now actively extended to new
owners by analogy to the Golden State rationale. Thus, for example, in
Iowa successors are held responsible for remedying their predecessors'
racial discrimination violations. 8' Kansas courts will hold a bona fide
successor liable for its predecessor's sex discrimination only upon une-
quivocal evidence of the successor's knowledge of the claim prior to the
sale.' 82 In New York, successors face wage and hour and overtime reme-
dial obligations for their predecessors' state labor standards violations. 83
ceased to exist after the sale of assets. Id. at 51. See also Bottger v. Doss Aeronautical Services, Inc.,
609 F. Supp. 583, 588 (M.D. Ala. 1985) ("successor in interest" finding based upon continuity of
employees, supervisors, functions and working conditions where common ownership absent; bona
fide successor jointly liable with seller for back pay with interest for seller's unlawful refusal to grant
leave for active military duty).
179. Cox v. Feeders Supply Co., 344 F.2d 924 (6th Cir. 1965) (no liability where successor had
no knowledge of veteran's reemployment claim at time of purchase). Cf. Chaltry v. Ollie's Idea Inc.,
546 F. Supp. 44 (W.D. Mich. 1982) (veteran informed seller of intention to return before commenc-
ing military service; successor's knowledge of potential liability inferred from conversation between
lawyers for seller and buyer).
180. 38 U.S.C. § 2021(a)(B)(i), (ii) (1982).
181. First Judicial Dist., Dept. of Correctional Services v. Iowa Civil Rights Comm'n, 315
N.W.2d 83, 90 (Iowa 1982).
182. Kansas Comm'n on Civil Rights v. Service Envelope Co., 233 Kan. 20, 25, 660 P.2d 549, 43
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1191 (1963) (Golden State holding limited to ownership transfer cir-
cumstances involving evasion, fraud, merger or consolidation mere continuance of violator, or assent
to be bound).
183. Hull-Hazard, Inc. v. Roberts, 129 A.D.2d 348, 517 N.Y.S.2d 824 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987)
(no liability where 50% of owner interest unrelated to predecessor) (dissent cited Golden State, 517
N.Y.S.2d at 828).
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In California, agricultural employers are potentially liable to their prede-
cessors' unfair labor practices and unlawful withdrawals of union recog-
nition.I 4 Significantly, some states require the purchaser of a unionized
company to adopt the seller's collective bargaining contract. 85
Other state law developments expose successors to liability under com-
mon law tort and breach of contract claims without reference to any
statute. Several federal courts have allowed state law actions by prede-
cessors' employees against new owners for the tort of intentional interfer-
ence with economic relations,'86 and breach of promises to hire after the
transfer of ownership.'87 In these circumstances, successorship status is
not required. The risk of liability rises directly from the new owner's
decisions on hiring the predecessor's workforce. But by both analogy to
Golden State and by direct application of state common law, new owners,
whether "successors" or not, face expanding liability risks under state
laws.
V. POTENTIAL LIABILITIES
As employment-related laws expand beyond the traditional areas of
employee organizational rights and enforcement of collective bargaining
agreements, the scope of potential obligations for new owners increases
as well. Successors face a more imminent chance of liability for their
predecessors' actions under some employment-related statutes than
under others. ERISA pension plan protections span certain statutorily
defined transfers of ownership and have already generated numerous
claims against, and liability risks for, both sellers and new owners. Fur-
ther, although under the Occupational Health and Safety Act (OSHA),
184. San Clemente Ranch v. Agric. Labor Bd., 166 Cal. Rptr. 375, 413, 414, 418 (Cal. Ct. App.
1980), aff'd, 29 Cal. 3d 848, 633 P.2d 949, 178 Cal. Rptr. 755 (1981).
185. Eg., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 706 (Supp. 1988); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 48, 2571 (Smith-
Hurd Supp. 1988); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 149, § 179C (Law. Co-op Supp. 1988); OHio REv. CODE
ANN. § 4113.30 (Anderson 1980). These state requirements, which are contrary to federal labor
policy established in Burns, may be vulnerable on federal preemption grounds. Cf. Local 20, Team-
sters v. Morton, 377 U.S. 252, 260 (1964) (States may not by policy or legislation upset the balance
of power between labor or management expressed in national labor policy); Hull v. Florida, 325 U.S.
538 (1944). See also Note, Labor Policy and Private Determination of Successor Liability: Illinois
Successor Clause Statute, 67 WASH. U.L.Q. 575 (1989).
186. E.g., Shannon v. Potter Distilleries, Inc., 678 F. Supp. 239 (D. Ore. 1987).
187. Parker v. Diamond Crystal Salt Co., 683 F. Supp. 168 (W.D. Mich. 1988) (no breach
where successor did not guarantee employment to predecessor's employees); Jeffers v. Convoy Co., 1
I.E.R. 919 (D. Minn. 1986) (fraud claim for breach of promise to hire all of seller's employees
preempted by contractual exhaustion requirement).
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successors are not currently at risk for their predecessors' violations, the
continued validity of this precedent is in doubt.
Successor liability may also be forthcoming under other statutes.
Anti-racketeering legislation has been extended to employer-employee
relationships, providing a civil cause of action against employers who
terminate employees for "blowing the whistle" on company activities
which arguably are interdicted by RICO. Recent federal statutes affect-
ing the hiring of aliens and regulating plant closings impose significant
restrictions on managerial discretion to hire and fire workers and to con-
tinue or discontinue the business. Although no court has yet imposed
liability under these statutes, the discussion below outlines why succes-
sors may not long escape these liabilities. Given the dangers of such po-
tential liabilities, prudence dictates that, at a minimum, a purchaser at
least attempt to assess and protect against these liabilities, through an
indemnification agreement or otherwise, before consummating a
purchase.
A. ER ISA
The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA)1 88
increases the costs of buying and selling operations with employees cov-
ered by pension and welfare benefit plans189 and creates incentives for
sellers to transfer pension obligations to buyers thereby creating addi-
tional fiscal obligations for new owners.
First, Title I requires parties to multiemployer plans to make timely
contributions 90 and creates a cause of an action to recover delinquent
contributions.' 9 ' Thus, a new owner could acquire the seller's contribu-
tory obligations upon the transfer of ownership, even by an assets
purchase, if the new owner meets the test of successorship, 192 or ex-
pressly agrees to continue making timely contributions to the plan. The
decision to continue contributions renders the new owner an "employer
... obligated to make contributions," and under the successor doctrine
188. 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 1001-1461 (1985 & West Supp. 1988).
189. By 1984, eight million persons were receiving pension income from private pension plans.
U.S. Bureau of the Census, Economic Characteristics of Households in the United States (3d Quarter
1984). Millions more are now covered by such plans.
190. 29 U.S.C. § 1145 (1982).
191. Id. § 1132.
192. Trustees for Alaska Laborers v. Ferrell, 812 F.2d 512, 515-17 (9th Cir. 1987).
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assent can be constructively created.1 93 This language appears to allow a
new owner to avoid liability by taking no action that could be construed
as consent to become an "employer obligated to make contributions"
under the statute and by avoiding becoming a successor by operation of
law. 194
Second, new owners may face back pay and reinstatement liabilities for
the seller's violation of ERISA section 510195 based on analogous exten-
sions of these obligations under the antidiscrimination provisions of the
NLRA and Title VII.'9 6 Section 510 protects employees from discharge
or discrimination "for the purpose of interfering with the attainment of
any right" under an employee benefit plan. 197 Courts have rejected per
se applications of this protection by interpreting this provision to require
specific evidence of unlawful motive' 98 to interfere with the attainment of
plan benefits. 199 Assuming that such an evidentiary burden is met and
that an unremedied section 510 violation exists at the time of a transfer
of ownership, a court might justify an order against a successor by refer-
ence to the broad remedial purpose of ERISA to make the promise of a
pension "real rather than illusory.' '2"" Foreseeably, a court could require
193. Id. See also Massachusetts Laborers' Health & Welfare Fund v. Starrett Paving Corp., 845
F.2d 23, 24 (1st Cir. 1988).
194. Cf Int'l Brotherhood of Painters & Allied Trade Unions v. George A. Kracher, Inc., 856
F.2d 1546, 1550 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (1980 ERISA amendments establishing a cause of action for collec-
tion designed to simplify collection procedures, not to expand liability "beyond parties who in a plan
or collective bargaining agreement obligated themselves to make these contributions."). Accord
Plumbers' Pension Fund, Local 130 v. Niedrich, 701 F. Supp. 651 (N.D. Ill. 1988).
195. 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (1982). See Folz v. Marriott Corp., 594 F. Supp. 1007, 1015 (W.D. Mo.
1984) (upholding reinstatement and back pay remedies in addition to plan reinstatement against
violator).
196. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3); 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000(e)-2 (1982).
197. 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (1982). See Calhoun v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 478 F. Supp. 357, 360
(E.D. Mo. 1979) (not limited to vested benefits).
198. Aronson v. Servus Rubber, Div. of Chromalloy, 730 F.2d 12, 16 (1st Cir.) (group termina-
tion of employees alone not violative of § 510), cert denied, 469 U.S. 1017 (1984). See also Phillips
v. Amoco Oil Co., 614 F. Supp. 694, 721-23 (N.D. Ala. 1985) (citing ERISA legislative history
drawing express parallel to § 8(a)(3) of the NLRA and concluding sale motivated by legitimate
business reasons), aff'd, 799 F.2d 1464 (11th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1016 (1987); Sutton v.
Weirton Steel, 567 F. Supp. 1184 (N.D. W. Va. 1983) (termination of all employees in connection
with a sale does not violate ERISA), aff'd, 724 F.2d 406 (4th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1205
(1984).
199. See, e.g., Dister v. Continental Group, Inc., 859 F.2d 1108, 1110-114 (2d Cir. 1988) (adopt-
ing evidentiary burdens and order of proof under Title VII); Ferguson v. Freedom Forge Corp., 604
F. Supp. 1157, 1162 (W.D. Pa. 1985) (true purpose motive standard).
200. H.R. REP. No. 533, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 4639, 4648.
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a successor to assume make-whole relief, other than plan reinstatement,
even where the successor had not consented to making contributions to
the benefit plan.2 10 To date, in two reported cases claims against new
owners have been dismissed where the predecessor fully awarded em-
ployees their accrued benefits at the time operations ceased 20 2 and where
the new owner continued the employment of those employees who would
have been entitled to shutdown benefits if their employment had not been
continued.2 °3
Finally, Title III of ERISA,2° as amended in 1980, 1986, and 1987,
creates an insurance system designed to indemnify employees in tax-qual-
ified defined benefit plans against the loss or diminution of their vested
pensions benefits.2"5 Under the 1987 amendments, a defined benefit plan
must be fully funded before it can be terminated.
Different events may trigger potential liability for a new owner for un-
funded defined benefit commitments depending upon whether the plan is
a single employer or multiemployer plan:20 6 the termination of the pred-
ecessor's single employer plan or the cessation of operations resulting in
the loss of employment of more than twenty percent of single employer
plan participants;207 or a "substantial employer's" withdrawal from a
201. See Boesl v. Suburban Trust and Say. Bank, 642 F. Supp. 1503, 1515 (N.D. Ill. 1986). See
generally Martucci & Utz, Unlawful Interference with Protected Rights Under ERISA, 2 LAB. LAW.
251 (1986). A successor who acts so as to deprive the predecessor's employees of accrued pension
benefits would be directly liable because the scope of § 510 extends to "any person" or
"corporation."
202. West v. Greyhound Corp., 813 F.2d 951, 955 (9th Cir. 1987) (citing Bellingham Frozen
Foods, Inc. v. NLRB, 626 F.2d 674 (9th Cir. 1980) (successor free to set initial terms of employment
and this right not restrained by § 510).
203. Varhola v. Doe, 820 F.2d 809 (6th Cir. 1987) (no § 510 violation where new owner contin-
ued employment of certain employees without shutdown benefits while those not hired received
shutdown benefits).
204. 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 1301-1381 (1985 & West Supp. 1988). See generally Welch, Employee Ben-
efit Issues, 10 INDus. REL. L.J. 84 (1988).
205. Defined contribution plans are not insured. 29 U.S.C. § 1002 (34) & (35) (1985).
206. In single employer plans, the employer's withdrawal liability is either 1) the difference be-
tween "the current value of the plan's benefits guaranteed under [ERISA] on the date of termina-
tion" and "the current value of the plan's assets allocated to such benefits on the date of
termination" or 2) thirty percent of the employer's networth, whichever is less. 29 U.S.C. § 1362(b)
(1985). In multiemployer plans, withdrawal liability for the seller is calculated by the proportionate
share of the unfunded vested benefits determined primarily by the extent of the employer's prior
participation in the pension plan. 29 U.S.C. § 1391 (1985); Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. v. R.A.
Gray & Co., 467 U.S. 717, 725 (1984). Litigated multiemployer plan cases demonstrate that this
liability can be considerable. Eg., Barbizon Corp. v. ILGWU Nat'l Retirement Fund, 842 F.2d 627
(2d Cir. 1988) ($1.5 million), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 495 (1988).
207. 29 U.S.C.A. § 1362(e) (West Supp. 1988).
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multiemployer plan prior to plan termination.20
Whether a new employer is obligated to continue the predecessor's
plan or assume withdrawal liability, unlike most other labor law obliga-
tions, depends upon the form of the transfer of ownership and whether
the plan is single employer or multiemployer. For single employer plan
obligations, contribution liability is transferred to new owners (whether
successors or not) by express legislative direction when the predecessor
ceases to exist because of a "reorganization" involving only a change of
identity, a "liquidation" of a subsidiary into its parent corporation, or a
"merger, consolidation or division., 219  In these transfer of ownership
circumstances, no termination of the single employer plan takes place.
If, on the other hand, an assets purchase takes place, a termination is
created and the seller is obligated to fully fund the plan.210 Thus, arms-
length assets purchasers who are not members of the "controlled group"
that includes the seller should be beyond the reach of liability for un-
funded single employer pension plan benefits.21 It would appear then
that a Wiley successor would be liable by merger to continue its prede-
cessor's single employer plan, but a Burns (third-party contract award), a
Golden State (arms-length assets purchase; no common ownership), and
a Fall River (purchase at creditor's sale) new owner would not. The
question is not free from doubt, because the applicable opinion has not
considered circumstances where the new owner is nonunion, the sale re-
sults in the forfeiture of accrued pension benefits, or where the successor
doctrine is an independent source of liability.2 12
ERISA section 4218(1) transfers multiemployer defined benefit plan
208, A "substantial employer" contributes 10% or more of all employer contributions to the
plan either during two of the immediately preceding plan years or during the second and third
preceding plan years. 29 U.S.C.A. § 1301(a)(2) (West Supp. 1988).
Liability also attaches if the "principal purpose of any transaction" is to avoid a multiemployer
defined benefit contribution obligation created by a collective bargaining agreement or the National
Labor Relations Act. Id. § 1392(c). Cf. Cuyamaca Meats v. Pension Trust Fund, 827 F.2d 491, 499
(9th Cir. 1987) (collective bargaining proposals designed to minimize withdrawal liability not for
purpose of evading or avoiding liability).
209. 29 U.S.C.A. § 1362(d) (West Supp. 1988).
210. New York State Teamsters Conf. Pension & Retirement Fund v. St. Lawrence Transit Mix
Corp., 612 F. Supp. 1003 (N.D.N.Y. 1985). The seller's liability is calculated under formulas set
forth in § 4225. 29 U.S.C. § 1405 (1982).
211. Kruegar, Corporate Transactions after ERISA: Acquisitions, Reorganizations and Divesti-
tures, 1979 DUKE L.J. 489, 502.
212. Opinion Letter of Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. No. 78-10 (1978) (asset purchaser who
hired most of predecessor's employees, recognized predecessor's union, and established new plans
with similar benefits not a successor under § 4062(d)).
1989]
Washington University Open Scholarship
414 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
contributions to new owners who acquire their predecessors' operations
through any of the transaction forms which, as noted above, transfer
contribution liability to new owners of operations covered by single em-
ployer defined benefit plans.213 Thus, as in the case of single employer
plans, the seller incurs responsibility for unfunded withdrawal liability of
a multiemployer plan where an assets purchase occurs,214 unless the
"bona fide, arms-length sale of assets" purchaser 1) agrees to continue
contributions to the plan, 2) purchases a surety bond covering five plan
years in an amount determined by statutory formula, and 3) the seller
agrees in the sales agreement to be secondarily liable for the buyer's with-
drawal for the first five years of the plan after the date of sale.215
In assets purchases, it is in the seller's interest to have the buyer agree
to hire the covered employees and continue the benefit plan after the sale.
This avoids the potentially crippling burden of paying unfunded with-
drawal liability. The buyer's primary interest is to assure that the
purchase price is low enough to allow absorption of the increased labor
costs directly resulting from the continuation of the seller's defined bene-
fit plan. If, on the other hand, the buyer refuses to do so, the seller must
ensure that the purchase price is high enough to cover its resulting with-
drawal liability.
The primary ERISA impact, then, for any purchaser is the compara-
tive costs to the parties of either adoption of the existing plan or the
withdrawal liability.216 A secondary but potentially as important impact
213. 29 U.S.C. § 1398(1). See Dora's Transp. Inc. v. Teamsters Pension Trust Fund of Phila.,
787 F.2d 897 (3d Cir. 1986); Connors v. B & W Coal Co., 646 F. Supp. 164 (D.D.C. 1986); Opinion
Letter of Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp., No. 82-84 (1982).
214. Section 4201(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1381(a) (1982). Cf Richland Indus. Ltd. v. Robbins, 617 F.
Supp. 639, 641-43 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (assets purchaser not liable for predecessor'spre-ERISA multiem-
ployer plan withdrawal liability albeit a successor).
215. Section 4204(a)(1)(A)(B)(C); 29 U.S.C. § 1384(a)(1) (1982). See, e.g., Park South Hotel
Corp. v. New York Hotel Trades Council, 851 F.2d 578, 582-84 (2d Cir. 1988), rev'g 671 F. Supp.
1000 (S.D.N.Y. 1987), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 493 (1988); Steelworkers, Local 2116 v. Cyclops
Corp., 860 F.2d 189, 203 (6th Cir. 1988); Teamsters Pension Trust Fund v. Central Michigan Truck-
ing, 857 F.2d 1107, 1109-10 (6th Cir. 1988). See also Young v. Standard Oil, 849 F.2d 1039, 1048
(7th Cir. 1988) (no liability for severance pay where covered employees offered employment by suc-
cessor), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 529 (1988); Accardi v. Control Data Corp., 836 F.2d 126 (2d Cir.
1987) (no liability for severance pay upon sale of a division), rev'g, 658 F. Supp. 881 (S.D.NY.
1987).
New owners who agree to these statutory requirements thereby assume more than make-whole
liability for withdrawal or failure to make a withdrawal payment during the five year plan period.
See §§ 4204(a)(2), (b)(1)(2); 29 U.S.C. §§ 1384(a)(2), (b)(l)(2) (1982).
216. See Welch, supra note 204, at 84-86.
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is that if the assets purchaser agrees to continue the plan, the new owner
will have by necessity hired all of the covered employees, thereby ipso
facto satisfying the prerequisite "employed continuity" test which could
place the owner "in the shoes" of the seller for other labor-related obliga-
tions under the successorship doctrine.
B. Occupational Safety and Health Act
The Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (OSHA) 17 was en-
acted "to assure so far as possible" safe and healthful working conditions
for all employees218 employed in a business "which affects commerce." '19
OSHA authorizes the Secretary of Labor to develop "national consen-
sus" occupational safety and health standards, 220 to conduct on-site in-
spections and investigations, 221 and to require employers to maintain
records and make periodic reports on workplace injuries. 22 The Secre-
tary of Labor may also, "upon inspection or investigation, '223 issue cita-
tions for alleged violations of the employer's general duty to secure
workplace safety from recognized hazards, 224 or from violations of any
other consensus standards or regulations promulgated by the Secretary.
The Secretary's rulemaking, inspection and citation authority is dis-
tinct from the adjudicative duties assigned to the Occupational Safety
and Health Review Commission. 225  The Commission confronted the
reach of the Secretary's citation authority early in its history and ruled
that successors could not be held liable for the predecessor's violations
because the Secretary's jurisdiction under section 9(a) is predicated on an
"inspection or investigation. '2 2 6 After Golden State, the Secretary again
attempted to bridge a sale of ownership by imposing liability on the new
employer, but the Commission reaffirmed its prior holding that a citation
is a condition precedent to a Secretary's proceeding against any
217. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1982).
218. OSHA § 2(b), 29 U.S.C. § 651(b) (1982).
219. Id. § 3(6), 29 U.S.C. § 652(6) (1982).
220. Id. § 6(a), 29 U.S.C. § 655(a).
221. Id. § 8(a), 29 U.S.C. § 657(a).
222. Id. § 8(c)(1), (2), 29 U.S.C. § 657(c)(1), (2).
223. Id. § 9(a), 29 U.S.C. § 658(a).
224. Id. § 5(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(1). See also UAW v. General Dynamics Land Systems
Div., 815 F.2d 1570 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (compliance with a specific OSHA standard does not ipso facto
absolve employer from further complying with general duties under OSHA).
225. OSHA § 12(a), 29 U.S.C. § 661(a).
226. The Anaconda Company, 1 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 3175 (1973).
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employer. 227
The statutory language in section 9(a) is similar to the "person named
in the complaint" limitation of section 10(c) of the NLRA. The Supreme
Court's summary rejection of a literal reading of the language in section
10(c) of the NLRA 221 in Golden State suggests that section 9(a) of
OSHA could also be construed to permit application of fines, compliance
and notice posting obligations under OSHA to bona fide successors who
acquire workplaces carrying unremedied OSHA citations. The Commis-
sion's statutory remedial authority, however, does not specifically in-
struct it to "effectuate the policies" of OSHA, in contrast to the language
in the NLRA. This language in fact, provided the basis for the Supreme
Court's rationale for upholding the Labor Board's authority to reach suc-
cessors under the NLRA.229 Even in the absence of such language, the
Commission weighs this remedial concept-effectuation of OSHA's poli-
cies-in its assessment of appropriate remedies.230 In addition, the fore-
going distinction between the statutory language found in OSHA and
that found in the NLRA could be overcome by attributing paramount
weight to the broad congressional purpose of securing safe working con-
ditions. Further, the Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commis-
sion (F.M.S.H.R.C.) overcame similar language in applying its orders to
new owner operators.23' It seems reasonable, then, to predict that the
weight of Supreme Court authority, the cumulative expansion of succes-
sor liability by lower courts, and the F.M.S.H.R.C.'s imposition of reme-
dial obligations upon innocent new owners will eventually lead to the
Commission's reversal of this policy. 232
In addition, an analogy to the Mine Safety and Health Act seems
likely to lead to the imposition of reinstatement and back pay remedies
upon successors who acquire operations from sellers who have dis-
227. Clearwater Veneer Co., 3 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 1216, 1218 (1975). The Commission has also
ruled that a violator who goes out of business is beyond a penalty sanction. L.R. Ward Steel Prods.
Inc., 5 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 1931 (1977).
228. See supra note 32 for text of NLRA § 10(c).
229. Golden State, 414 U.S. 168, 175-77 (1973). See also supra Part 11(B).
230. See, eg., Secretary v. Crescent Warf& Warehouse Co., 1 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 1219, 1221-23
(1973).
231. See supra Part IV(C).
232. Dificult questions of employer knowledge and lack of opportunity to seek indemnification
for OSHA fines will be presented if this reversal is achieved, however, because the Secretary is al.
lowed considerable time between conducting an inspection and issuing a citation. See, e.g., Donovan
v. Royal Logging Co., 645 F.2d 822 (9th Cir. 1981) (five-month delay between inspection and cita-
tion is "reasonable promptness" absent showing of prejudice).
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charged employees for exercising OSHA notice and complaint rights233
before the sale.234
C. RICO
The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act of 1970
(RICO)23 5 creates a civil cause of action for "any person injured in his
business or property by reason of a violation of section 1962. ' '26 This
section provides in pertinent part that:
[i]t shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any
enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign
commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct
of such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity or col-
lection of unlawful debt.2 37
Injured parties may recover treble damages, litigation costs, and reason-
able attorneys' fees.238
Employees have instituted suits against their former employers under
section 1964 as separate counts in actions for wrongful discharge. These
claims include allegations that an employee's discharge, resulting in in-
jury to their employability, occurred for "blowing the whistle" on crimi-
nal conduct alleged to violate RICO after the employee discovered or
refused to participate in that activity.239 In addition, employees have al-
leged breaches of employment contracts on the grounds that their em-
ployers engaged in criminal conspiracies or fraud, or both to deprive
them of employment, to deny them pension and other benefits, and to
subject them to sexual harassment. 2"
In Sedima v. Imrex Co. 241 the Supreme Court interpreted narrowly the
language "by reason of" in section 1964(c) as a standing requirement
that the claimed injury must result from the conduct constituting the
233. OSHA § 11(c), 29 U.S.C. § 660(c) (1982).
234. See supra Part IV(C).
235, 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1961-1968 (1984 & West Supp. 1988).
236. RICO § 901(c), 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1982).
237. Id. § 901(c), 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c).
238. Id. § 901(c), 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c).
239. See, eg., Cullom v. Hibernia National Bank, 859 F.2d 1211 (5th Cir. 1988). In one unre-
ported case, a federal jury awarded $43 million in treble damages to an employee fired for refusing to
participate in "cover up" security fraud violations. Harrison, Look ho's Using RICO, 75 A.B.A. J.
56 (Feb. 1989).
240. See generally Shepard, Horn, & Duston, RICO and Employment Law, 3 LAB. L. 267, 276-
82 (1987).
241. 473 U.S. 479 (1985).
1989]
Washington University Open Scholarship
418 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
RICO violation.242 Most courts dismiss RICO claims unless an em-
ployee can show a causal nexus in one of two ways: the discharge itself
constituted a RICO violation, or the employee was a target or victim of
"predicate acts. '24 3
To date, no reported decisions have required a new owner to pay treble
damages as an innocent successor where a transfer of ownership occurs
before compliance with court ordered remedies. However, it seems un-
likely that a transfer of ownership will allow employers found liable to
their employees for injuries to employability, or their "successors," to
escape entirely treble damage judgments. Certainly the parameters of
this civil cause of action as applied to labor disputes in general or to
successorship liability in particular will not be finally determined for
years.244 Therefore, for the foreseeable future, RICO wrongful discharge
and conspiracy actions will continue to pose at least potential liabilities
for new owners.
D. Immigration Reform and Control Act
Beginning November 6, 1986, the Immigration Reform and Control
Act of 1986 (IRCA)2 45 imposes recordkeeping, employment verification,
and antidiscrimination requirements on all employers with four or more
employees. 2' The Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) began
issuing citations in May 1987 and enforcing fine collections in May 1988.
After a hearing, an ALJ may impose fines of $100 to $1000 for record-
keeping violations or for failures to verify the legal work status of job
applicants even if an illegal worker is never employed. 247 For second or
242. 473 U.S. at 495, 496-97.
243. See, eg., Cullom, 859 F.2d 1211 (5th Cir. 1988); Prijol v. Shearson Am. Express, Inc., 829
F.2d 1201 (1st Cir. 1987); Nodine v. Textron, Inc., 819 F.2d 347 (1st Cir. 1987); Morast v. Lance,
807 F.2d 926 (11th Cir. 1987). But see Williams v. Hall, 683 F. Supp. 639 (E.D. Ky.) (standing
exists where dischargee alleges RICO violations but injury resulted from acts which are not "predi-
cate acts"), appeal dismissed mem, 853 F.2d 927 (6th Cir. 1988); Acampora v. Boise Cascade Corp.,
635 F. Supp. 66 (D.N.J. 1986) (standing to sue where fired for discovering illegal activities); Callan
v. State Chem. Mfg. Co., 584 F. Supp. 619 (E.D. Pa. 1984) (standing where discharged for refusing
to participate in bribery scheme).
244, See Note, The Exclusive Jurisdiction of the NLRB as a Limitation on the ,4pplication of
RICO to Labor Disputes, 76 Ky. L.J. 210 (1987-88) (arguing for RICO jurisdiction in employment
disputes unless court must determine whether alleged "predicate act" is an unfair labor practice
under NLRA § 8).
245. Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359 (1986) (IRCA) (codified in scatter sections beginning at
8 U.S.C. § 1324a (Supp. IV 1986)).
246. Id.
247. Id.
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third violations, penalties up to $10,000 per alien may be imposed on an
employer, and if a "pattern of violations" is found, an employer may face
fines of $3000 per alien, or up to six months imprisonment, or both.248
The Act creates a new "citizenship" class of workers protected from
employment discrimination.24 9 U.S. citizens, temporary and permanent
resident aliens, 250 refugees, and persons granted asylum who intend to
become a citizen may file discrimination complaints with the Special
Counsel for Immigration Related Unfair Employment Practices.251
Remedies for violations include reinstatement or hiring requirements (for
applicants), back pay and reasonable attorneys' fees including those in-
curred during the administrative proceedings, and fines of $1000 to
$3000 per violation.252
The Act is entirely silent as to the consequences of a transfer of owner-
ship upon outstanding recordkeeping, work verification, and discrimina-
tion violations. INS regulations concerning reverification obviate this
requirement when an employee "continues his employment with a re-
lated, successor or reorganized employer. 2 53 The regulations define a
"successor" as an employer "who continues to employ some or all of a
previous employer's work force in cases involving a... sale of stock or
assets.... 254 These regulations, however, assume compliance by the
seller and require the new owner to obtain and maintain the seller's em-
ployment records and immigration service forms. 255
In the event of outstanding noncompliance or existing unremedied dis-
crimination violations at the time of sale, a court could apply these regu-
lations to enforce remedial obligations against new owners by analogy to
Golden State and MacMillan. A court would not be restrained by the
248. IRCA § 101(a) (amending the Immigration and Naturalization Act, §§ 274A(e)(4),
274A(f) (hereinafter I.N.A.)) (codified at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1324a(e)(4), 1324(f) (Supp. IV 1986)).
249. Id. § 102(a) (amending INA §§ 274B(a)(1), 274B(a)(3)) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1324b(a)(1),
(3) (Supp. IV 1986)). See generally 52 FED. REG. 37,409 (1987), 53 FED. REG. 10,339 (1988) (to be
codified at 44 C.F.R. § 44.106-301).
250. It is estimated that from 3 to 10 million undocumented aliens are in the United States. See
Besnoff, How to Comply with the Immigration Reform Act, MGMT. SOLUTIONS 12, 16 (August 1987).
251. IRCA § 102(a) (amending I.N.A. § 274B(b)) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1324b(1)(a) (Supp. IV
1986)),
252. Id. (amending I.N.A. §§ 274B(g)(2), 274(h), 274B(b)) (codified at 8 U.S.C.
§§ 1324b(g)(2)(B), 1324b(h) (Supp. IV 1986)).
253. 8 C.F.R. § 274a (1988) (incorporating Part 109). See generally Jacobs, Unforeseen Obliga-
tions of Successor Employers in 40 PROCEEDINGS OF N.Y.U. NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON LABOR
§ 6.03 (B. Stein, ed. 1987).
254. Id. (emphasis added).
255. See Jacobs, supra note 253.
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present requirement that the buyer hire a new unit composed of a major-
ity of the seller's employees. The court could use the IRCA regulation's
language "some" to reach buyers who hire "some," or, less than a major-
ity of the seller's employees. Thus, is it likely that new owners will be
required to remedy their sellers' Immigration Reform and Control Act
violations, and these obligations will be transferred to new owners with a
minority of predecessor employees on their payroll.
E. Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act
The Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act
(W.A.R.N.),25 6 effective February 4, 1989,257 requires "business enter-
prises" employing a minimum of 100 employees2"8 to give any "affected
employees, '259 and State Dislocated Worker Units26° sixty days prior no-
tice of any plant closing, mass layoff, or employment termination by sale
to a purchaser. The Act also requires purchasers to delay "mass layoffs"
or a plant closing for at least sixty days after commencing operations.
The Act authorizes the Secretary of Labor to draft "interpretative"
regulations as compliance guidelines "to carry out this act" 261 but does
not delegate enforcement authority to the Department of Labor or to
state governments.262 Instead, any affected employee, employee repre-
sentative or state government unit may bring suit individually or by a
class action in a federal district court where the alleged violation oc-
curred or where the employer transacts business.263 Penalties include
employer liability for back pay and benefits, including medical expenses
for each day of the violation period up to a maximum of sixty days, and a
$500 fine per day for failure to give notice to a local government unit up
to a maximum of sixty days ($30,000). 264 Federal courts do not have
authority under W.A.R.N. to enjoin a pending purchase or sale.
Although W.A.R.N.'s notice provisions appear straight forward, they
inaugurate onerous, complex, and confusing burdens, particulary for sell-
256. PUB. L. 100-379, 102 Stat. 890 (1988) (W.A.R.N.) (to be codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 2101-
2109).
257. W.A.R.N. § 11 (to be codified at 29 U.S.C. § 2101 (note)).
258. Id. § 2(a)(1) (to be codified at 29 U.S.C. § 2101(a)(1)).
259. Id. §§ 2(a)(5), 3(a)(1) (to be codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 2101(a)(5), 2101(a)(1)).
260. Id. § 3(a)(1) (to be codified at 29 U.S.C. § 2102(a)(1)).
261. Id. §§ 8, 11 (to be codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 2107, 2101(note)).
262. 53 FED. REG. 43,736 (1988).
263. W.A.R.N. § 5(a)(1) (to be codified at 29 U.S.C. § 2104(a)(1)).
264. Id. § 5(a)(2) (to be codified at 29 U.SiC. § 2104(a)(2)).
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ers and buyers. Most significantly, W.A.R.N. may adversely redefine the
successorship doctrine employee continuity factor. This is so because
section 2(b)(1) effectively awards "tenure" to the predecessor's employ-
ees by providing that "any person who is an employee of the seller (other
than a part-time employee) as of the effective date of the sale shall be
considered an employee of the purchaser immediately after the effective
date of the sale.' 26 5 The Department of Labor's Proposed Rules purport
to limit section 2(b)(1) tenure by making it applicable only for purposes
of W.A.R.N.266 It is not apparent why continuing employee tenure must
be created merely to insure that a sale will not toll the maximum sixty
day liability period for the seller's employees who are terminated without
any or inadequate notice. There is no pre-enactment legislative history
to support the Department of Labor's interpretation. During the post-
enactment rulemaking process, the Act's principal authors stated that an
earlier Department of Labor version without language limiting tenure to
W.A.R.N. is a correct interpretation of section 2(b)(1). 267 On the other
hand, the same authorities stated that this provision "was not intended to
affect.. ." employee status after a sale under any other statutes.2 68 Even
if construed to be consistent, these post-enactment comments are not re-
assuring because they are personal views, not legislative history, and as
such should be given no weight in statutory construction. 69 Moreover,
the expansive statutory language makes no mention of preserving the
maximum liability period for affected employees, does not expressly fore-
close the requirement that the buyer hire the seller's affected employees
at least for this liability period,27 or in any way define the vague term
"tenure."
Despite these ambiguities, W.A.R.N. is the first federal statute to ex-
plicitly extend the employer-employee relationship across a transfer of
ownership. This legislation overlaps and potentially interdicts the new
265. Id. § 2(b)(1) (to be codified at 29 U.S.C. § 2101(b)(1)).
266. 53 FED. REG. 49,076, 49,083-84 (1988) (to be codified at 20 C.F.R. pt. 639.4(c)) (proposed
Dec. 5, 1988).
267. Comments Submitted to the Labor Department in Response to its Policy Paper on W.A.R.N.,
DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 209 at E-2 (Oct. 28, 1988) (written comments signed by Sen. Metzen-
baum and Reps. Ford, Clay and Jeffords).
268, Id.
269. Nat'l Woodwork Mfg. Ass'n v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612, 639 n.34 (1967).
270. Comments on the Labor Department's Interim Rule Interpreting the Worker Adjustment
and Retraining Notification Act, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 35, at D-8 (Feb. 23, 1989) (written
comments by Business Roundtable).
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owner's already circumscribed prerogatives271 to establish employment
conditions different from those of the seller prior to announcing an inten-
tion to hire or actually hiring an employee complement composed of a
majority of employees who formerly worked for the seller.2 72 The reality
is that W.A.R.N. does not inhibit the conversion of its continuing tenure
status into additional employees of the buyer who formerly worked for
the seller who must be counted in determining whether the buyer is a
successor subject to all the non-W.A.R.N. obligations catalogued by this
Article.
The Act's principal authors have also expressed the view that
W.A.R.N.'s monetary penalties, unlike its employee tenure, do not reach
across a transfer of ownership.273 These remarks are also post-enactment
and therefore can not be relied upon to settle this question. Moreover,
these remarks assume that the seller is financially able to remedy its
W.A.R.N. violations. Neither the language of the Act nor the views of
its sponsors provide any basis to assume that W.A.R.N. forecloses a fed-
eral judge from transferring the seller's workforce compensation obliga-
tions to a new owner when, by analogy to MacMillan, the court finds
that the seller is unable to provide "substantial relief" for its labor
violations.274
Finally, section 2(b)(1) also sets forth ill-considered and unexplained
rules governing W.A.R.N.'s application to "assets sales" involving "a
sale of part or all of an employer's business. '2 75 By reference to the Act's
sparse legislative history, the AFL-CIO construes these provisions to ex-
empt the seller from a notification obligation "where the buyer agrees to
hire the seller's employees. 276 If this view is correct, then sellers will be
under great pressure to avoid the risk of monetary penalties for inade-
quate notices by insisting that the buyer retain the seller's workforce.
This employee retention could also transform the buyer into a "succes-
271. See infra notes 278-290 and accompanying text.
272. Remarks of John S. Irving on Plant Closings Before NAM Conference, San Francisco, Oct.
25, 1988, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 207, at D-6, 7 (Oct. 26, 1988).
273. Comments Submitted to the Labor Department, supra note 267, at E-2.
274. Compare MacMillan, 503 F.2d 1086 (6th Cir. 1974), discussed supra note 132, with Brown
v. Evening News Ass'n, 473 F. Supp. 1242 (E.D. Mich. 1979), discussed supra note 145.
275. W.A.R.N. § 2(b)(1) (to be codified at 29 U.S.C. § 2101(b)(1)).
276. Comments Submitted to the Labor Department, supra note 267, at E-9 (comments of the
AFL-CIO). A seller who persuades a buyer to hire its employees might avoid a W.A.R.N. obliga-
tion because no "employment loss" affecting its workforce will occur. See Hunsicker, Federal Plant
Closing Law Insignificant to Philadelphia, LEG. INTELLIGENCES 9 (Oct. 31, 1988).
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sor," subject to myriad labor-related liabilities incurred by the seller
prior to the sale.
VI. TOWARD LIABILITY PER SE
The unvarying expansion of labor-related liabilities imposed upon new
owners has been accompanied by steady erosion of the elements of the
successor doctrine linked to "the rightful prerogative of owners indepen-
dently to rearrange their businesses."277 Not only have remedial obliga-
tions multiplied, but defenses have been nullified and procedural
safeguards have been disregarded or discarded. This dual dynamic has
now tilted the successor field toward per se liability. The number and
cumulative costs of transferred liabilities can no longer safely be ignored
by prospective purchasers when discovered prior to purchase. A new
owner can avoid these accumulating liabilities only if it elects to change
substantially the seller's operation and it hires preferably none, or at
most only a small minority, of the seller's employees. Today, it is in-
creasingly unlikely that a new owner can purchase a going concern and
operate it with the seller's experienced employees without simultaneously
assuming joint and several remedial liability for the seller's violations of a
variety of federal and state laws, being required to recognize the seller's
union despite operational modification and hiatus, or even in some cases,
accepting the seller's unexpired collective bargaining agreement.
The seminal decision that portends unrestricted labor law liability for
new owners is Fall River Dyeing & Finishing Corp. v. NLRB.278 This
modification of Burns not only "perpetuates an unpredictable network of
criteria [that] will work to discourage investment in the assets of failed
business,"" 9 it elevates the preservation of "industrial peace" over the
new owner's managerial prerogatives in nearly all transfer of ownership
circumstances.
The Fall River majority purportedly acknowledged that the new
owner's bargaining obligation is predicated on its consent, implied by "a
conscious decision to maintain generally the same business and to hire a
majority of its employees from the predecessor."280 However, the Court
277. Golden State v. NLRB, 414 U.S. 168, 182 (1973) (quoting John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v.
Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 549 (1964)).
278. 482 U.S. 27 (1987). See supra notes 98-104 and accompanying text.
279. Note, Expansion of the Successorship Doctrine-Fall River Dyeing & Finishing Corp. v.
NLRB, 23 WAKE FOREsT L. REv. 549 (1988).
280. Fall River, 482 U.S. 27, 41 (1987).
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actually imposed a continuing bargaining obligation upon a new owner
who had made a conscious and nondiscriminatory decision not to hire a
majority of its predecessor's employees in its two-shift work force.28 In
so doing, the Court announced a modified standard for determining con-
tinuity that minimized and declared largely irrelevant common business
purpose factors which had at least partly been essential for a "successor
finding." Neither the absence of any privity between the predecessor and
new owner, the distinction between an ongoing operation and a defunct
or moribund one, nor the existence of a lengthy operational hiatus can
now serve even in combination to preclude a successorship finding.
These functional realities, which reflect both how a transfer of ownership
occurs and when a new operation commences in temporal relation to the
seller's cessation, have been replaced with the narrow and rigid em-
ployee-focused consideration of comparative job function and reemploy-
ment expectation. The gymnastic ease with which the Court vaulted the
February to September hiatus between Sterlingwale's closedown and Fall
River's start up by focusing exclusively on employee job function belies
its statement that an operational hiatus remains a relevant limitation
upon inferences of a new owner's implied consent to assume a Burns
union bargaining obligation.282 Moreover, the Court's unconditional and
unexamined acceptance of the bald assertion that Sterlingwale's employ-
ees expected to continue in employment with Fall River despite
Sterlingwale's liquidation and the subsequent seven-month hiatus reflects
a value judgment that all employees retain a future expectation in any job
they can perform with minimum retraining, regardless of how far in the
future those jobs are created.
The majority's minimization of Fall River's operational changes which
included eliminating its predecessor's converting procedure, declining to
use Sterlingwale's trade name, goodwill, or customer lists, and using a
smaller plant with fewer employees working longer hours means that
only the most fundamental changes, those directly affecting employee job
tasks, have any possibility of overcoming a "operational continuity" find-
281. See supra note 98 and accompanying text. Recall that neither the union nor the Labor
Board's General Counsel ever alleged that any of Fall River's hiring was discriminatory because of
prounion support.
282. 482 U.S. at 45. See also NLRB v. Danecker Clock Co., 516 F.2d 315 (4th Cir. 1975) (eight
months hiatus immaterial); NLRB v. Jeffries Lithograph Co., 752 F.2d 459 (9th Cir. 1988) (eight
months too long to wait for hiring of "full employee complement") (citing NLRB v. Burns Int'l Sec.
Serv., 406 U.S. 272, 295 (1970)).
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ing.283 Additionally, these changes must somehow have a dramatic effect
upon the employees' "attitude toward continued representation." '284 The
availability of Labor Board-conducted elections to determine definitively
the question of employee attitude has, of course, been forgotten. The
latent judgment in this standard is that one who seeks the operational
advantage of continuing the products or services of a going concern will
not be allowed to reach that objective free from the restraining influences
of the seller's union. Only buyers who forswear this competitive advan-
tage by transforming the nature of the acquired business and the manner
in which the products and services are manufactured and distributed
have a chance of avoiding the "successor" label.
The Court's application of the "employee continuity" standard also
encourages a buyer to hire and train its own workforce and forego the
cost-efficient method of hiring the seller's experienced employee or else
risk the imposition of unassumed liabilities. The "substantial and repre-
sentative complement" fiction transfers with the predecessor's employees
a bargaining obligation whenever the new unit is composed of a majority
of employees hired from the predecessor. This bargaining obligation at-
taches regardless of how fleeting the majority in the buyer's hiring pro-
cess.285 The Court also left open the question of whether a new owner
283. 482 U.S. at 57-58 (Powell, J., dissenting). The majority opinion effectively overrules several
NLRB decisions which had considered similar changes to place the new owner outside the scope of
the successor doctrine. See, eg., id. at 56 n.4, 58 n.6 (citing cases).
284. United Mine Workers of America, Local 1329 v. NLRB, 812 F.2d 741, 743-44 (D.C. Cir.
1987) ("NLRB may make reasonable presumptions to perform this task").
285. It is nearly impossible to predict at what point or how the after-the-fact finder will deter-
mine whether a "representative complement" exists. See, eg., NLRB v. Houston Distrib. Serv. Inc.,
573 F.2d 260, 266 n.7 (5th Cir. 1978) ("Our holding is that the measuring day in every case is not the
first day of operation."), cert denied, 439 U.S. 1047 (1978). Of course, one can reasonably anticipate
that it will be the first time (or only time) the predecessor's employees outnumber new hires in the
buyer's unit after the predecessor's union demands recognition. See, eg., NLRB v. Cutter Dodge
Inc., 825 F.2d 1375 (9th Cir. 1987) (9 of 16, not 9 of 20, is "representative"); Hospital San Fran-
cisco, 293 N.L.R.B. No. 25 (Mar. 13, 1989) (operational expansion held not based on reasonable
certainty); Westridge Manor, Inc., 291 N.L.R.B. No. 5 (Sept. 27, 1988) ("substantial and representa-
tive" complement "found" within three days of union's written demand for recognition); Faria Ltd.,
287 N.L.R.B. No. 136, 130 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1140 (Feb. 26, 1988) (plan to expand workforce held
"speculative"); Miner Indus., Inc., 285 N.L.R.B. No. 36, 128 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1104 (Aug. 6, 1987)
("representative complement" in place). Cf. Myers Custom Prods. Inc., 278 N.L.R.B. 636 (1986)
(full complement date chosen over start-up date pre-Fall River).
Fall River also pro tanto overrules Pacific Hide & Fur Depot, Inc. v. NLRB, 553 F.2d 609 (9th
Cir. 1977). Today, after Fall River, Pacific would be said to have hired a "representative" comple-
ment of I 1 of the ultimate total of 19 employees, seven of the 11 previously employed by the seller,
the day after the union demanded recognition.
New owners who decline to hire the predecessor's employees are likely to have these hiring deci-
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who hires a majority of the predecessor's employees could be deemed a
"successor" regardless of the ratio of those employees to the successor's
new hires.2 86 If adopted as an alternative standard basis for determining
successor status, a court could make successor findings in nearly all cir-
cumstances where the seller's employees are hired into a larger operation.
The potentially staggering significance of the Court's adoption of the
"substantial and representative complement" hypothesis is that it modi-
fies the one fundamental and hitherto absolute touchstone and prerequi-
site of successorship-employee continuity as reflected by a majority of
the new owner's unit being composed of the seller's employees.2" 7 This is
now no longer the test of successorship in circumstances where the new
owner's hiring process is gradual-all those circumstances where the new
owner does not hire a majority of the seller's employees into its new unit
upon commencing operations.2"' Thus, Fall River may have profound
significance for the entire spectrum of successor liability, for it presages
that buyers who forego an experienced workforce will not only assume
the higher training cost and employability risks inherent in selecting new
employees, but also will acquire, without consent, remedial obligations as
46successors."
This erosion of the numerical majority requirement, well under way
before Fall River, has now received implicit sanction and can be expected
to accelerate. Recall that in MacMillan, the Sixth Circuit adopted the
"substantially the same" standard as a permissible alternative for deter-
mining successor liability under Title VII.289 The Labor Board later ap-
plied the same test to impose continuing bargaining obligations upon
employers who transfer or merge operations, or both.29
sions subjected to "searching scrutiny." Kessel Food Markets, Inc. v. NLRB, 130 L.R.R.M. (BNA)
2761 (6th Cir. March 1, 1989) (despite hiring discrimination, other business-related considerations
should have resulted in minority of predecessor's employees in successors employ); American Ind.
Cleaning Co. Inc., 291 N.L.R.B. No. 68 (Oct. 21, 1988) (burden on buyer to show valid business-
related justification for refusing to hire predecessor's employees). See also Scott v. El Farra Enter.,
863 F.2d 670 (9th Cir. 1988) (§ I0j) "reasonable cause" finding of discriminatory hiring valid basis
for assuming majority of buyer's unit "would have" been hired from predecessor's complement).
286. 482 U.S. at 46-47 n.12.
287. See supra notes 84-88 and accompanying text where it will be recalled the Labor Board's
first attempt to delute this numerical majority standard was rejected by the Ninth Circuit.
288. Int'l Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO v. NLRB, 595 F.2d 664, 669-70
n.29 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1070 (1979).
289. EEOC v. MacMillan Boedel Containers, Inc., 503 F.2d 1086, 1090 (6th Cir. 1974). See
supra notes 130-134 and accompanying text for discussion of MacMillan.
290. Westwood Import Co., Inc., 251 N.L.R.B. 1213 (1980), aff'd on other grounds, 681 F.2d
664, 667 n.2 (9th Cir. 1982); NLRB v. Marine Optical, Inc., 671 F.2d 11, 17 (Ist Cir. 1982) (approv-
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This "substantial percentage" test is also readily transferable to
changes in ownership.2 91 Recently, the NLRB held that financial obliga-
tions imposed upon new owners no longer require the successor to have a
majority of the violator's employees in its employ.292 It also seems likely
that under a "property right" theory, a buyer's remedial obligation to
provide full restitution including reinstatement for individual employees
will gradually be completely divorced from any consideration of the hir-
ing of any other former employees. This development would ultimately
impose liability upon new owners in virtually all transfer and acquisition
circumstances where the buyer has a position an employee can perform,
thereby creating job vesting across ownership transfers without a compa-
rable need of the legislative sanction for pension vesting obtained in
ERISA.
Although Fall River purports to reaffirm that portion of Burns that
precludes wholesale contract adoption remedies,293 the majority opinion
also cites Wiley.294 One therefore should presume that in a Wiley fact
pattern, the new owner can still be required to assume the predecessor's
unexpired contract under section 301 of the NLRA.295 Moreover, all
new owners will continue to face intensified inspection as to any acts or
omissions that a court or an arbitrator can magnify into "assent" to be
bound by the predecessor's contract.296
ing "substantial percentage" standard). Cf. Air Express Int'l Corp., 659 F.2d 610, 615-17 (5th Cir.
1981) (proper to presume transfer of terminated employees thereby creating majority in transferred
unit). But see Fraser & Johnston v. NLRB, 469 F.2d 1259, 1264-65 (9th Cir. 1972).
291. The AFL-CIO and the Labor Board have already urged adoption of this minimal standard.
See Brief for AFL-CIO at 3, 18-21, Fall River v. NLRB, 482 U.S. 27 (1987) (No. 85-1208) (substan-
tial carryover not majority in buyers unit sufficient for successorship status); Howard Johnson Co. v.
Detroit Local Joint Executive Bd., 417 U.S. 249, 260 n.6 (1974) (AFL-CIO argued where predeces-
sor's contract has successor clause unnecessary for buyer to have hired any of predecessor's employ-
ees); NLRB v. Bums, 406 U.S. 272, 281 n.6 (1972) (NLRB counsel argued "substantial number,"
not majority, sufficient).
292. St. Marys Foundry Co., 284 N.L.R.B. No. 30, n.4, 125 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1146 (June 12,
1987) ("large number" sufficient), overruling Airport Bus Service, 273 N.L.R.B. 561 (1984), enforced
sub nom. NLRB v. St. Marys Foundry, Co., 860 F.2d 679 (6th Cir. 1988).
293. Fall River, 482 U.S. at 40.
294. Id.
295. See Wood v. Teamsters, Local 406, 807 F.2d 493, (6th Cir. 1986) (held no contract adop-
tion remedy, limiting Wiley to its facts).
296. See, eg., NLRB v. Pine Valley Div. of Ethan Allen, Inc., 544 F.2d 742, 746 (4th Cir. 1976)
(payment by trustee bank of union dues, welfare fund contributions and new plant manager's assur-
ance that contract vacation pay would continue held to be adoption of entire contract by successor
despite disclaimer of knowledge of bank's action and claim that plant manager's comment was "off
hand"); Spitzer Akron, Inc. v. NLRB, 540 F.2d 841, 846 (6th Cir. 1976) (buyer's statement "carry
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Recent developments have also eliminated the Golden State require-
ment that a buyer have actual knowledge of the seller's violations prior
to the transfer of ownership.2 97 Indeed, the NLRB has inferred knowl-
edge from the buyer's prudent inquiries about the seller's liabilities29
and from the buyer's equally circumspect attempts to limit its liability.299
In addition, the buyer now bears the burden of proving its lack of knowl-
edge, contrary to the Golden State requirement the agency or employee
prove the presence of such knowledge." °
The Fall River extension of an NLRA bargaining obligation to a suc-
cessor who had no direct contractual or other business relationship with
the defunct predecessor 0 1 may also signal the eventual abandonment of
the Golden State "privity" requirement. Golden State required that priv-
ity exist between buyer and seller as a precondition to the imposition of
the seller's unsatisfied remedial obligations on the innocent new owner.
A contractual or other business relationship with the seller allows the
innocent buyer, through an indemnification or "hold harmless" agree-
ment, to limit liability for the increased fiscal cost of remedial compliance
and shifts alternate liability to the violator. The existence of such an
on as usual" sufficient to bind buyer to existing terms and conditions), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1040
(1977); Amateyus, Ltd., 280 N.L.R.B. No. 21, 123 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1341 (May 30, 1986) (compli-
ance with dues checkoff and health and welfare contributions sufficient to require contract adoption),
cert. denied sub nom. Amateyus, Ltd. v. NLRB, 108 S. Ct. 287 (1987). Cf. Armco, Inc., Eastern
Steel Div. Ashland Works, 291 N.L.R.B. No. 149, 130 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1315 (Dec. 15, 1988) (re-
manded for evidentiary hearing on whether successor agreed to monetary provisions of predecessor's
contract with another union).
Temporary injunctions issued pursuant to § 10(j) of the NLRA are now used to require a new
owner to adopt the sellers unexpired union contract. Eg., Asseo v. Hosp. San Francisco Inc., No.
88-1101 (D.P.R. Oct. 7, 1988).
297. NLRB v. St. Marys Foundry Co., 860 F.2d 679, 682 (6th Cir. 1988) (knowledge of allega-
tions that "could" violate the NLRA is sufficient); NLRB v. South Harlan Coal, Inc., 844 F.2d 380
(6th Cir. 1980) (circumstantial evidence supporting inference of knowledge, disagreeing that Domin-
quez v. Local 64, Bartenders, 674 F.2d 732 (9th Cir. 1982) requires direct knowledge); Signal Com-
munications, Inc., 284 N.L.R.B. No. 54, 126 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1355 (June 22, 1987) (backpay
liability imposed on successor although unfair labor charge not filed until after date of transfer).
298. Am-Del-Co., Inc., 234 N.L.R.B. 1040, 1040-41 (1970) (knowledge "inferred" from sellers'
indemnification clause referring generally to NLRA).
299. NLRB v. Jarm Enterprises, Inc., 785 F.2d 195 (7th Cir. 1986).
300. See, eg., Croley Coal Corp., 280 N.L.R.B. No. 104, 124 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1034 (June 24,
1986); Cumberland Nursing & Convalescent Center, 263 N.L.R.B. 428, 434 (1982) (knowledge of
"facts," not actual unfair labor practices charges, sufficient); Mansion House Center Management
Corp., 208 N.L.R.B. 684, 686 (1974) (employer has burden of raising and establishing defense of
lack of knowledge of unfair labor practice in successorship proceeding).
301. In the view of the dissenters, this fact was one of several that undermined the majority's
"substantial continuity" finding. 482 U.S. at 59 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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agreement between the buyer and seller in Golden State was a fundamen-
tal factor in the Court's explanation for holding an innocent and noncon-
senting buyer accountable for Golden State's remedial obligations to
Baker.3°2 Expanding monetary obligations to situations in which new
owners purchase failing businesses or acquire operations without assets
without any opportunity to negotiate a "hold harmless" agreement and
the seller retains no assets after the sale nullifies the innocent status of the
buyer and transforms the buyer into a violator for remedial purposes.30 3
The imposition of remedial obligations in these circumstances creates lia-
bility per se by virtue of the "successor" label alone.3"
Finally, the Court's refusal to consider evidence of Fall River em-
ployee dissatisfaction with Sterlingwale's union suggests that the present
Court is unsympathetic to claims by employers that their employees no
longer desire union representation. The Court also appears unconcerned
that newly hired employees are effectively disenfranchised by the Labor
Board's unsubstantiated inferences of continuing majority status.30 5 For
new owners to continue resisting NLRA bargaining obligations on these
grounds appears futile now that a majority of the Court has adopted ear-
lier federal circuit court opinions rejecting such contentions. 30 6
302. 414 U.S. 168, 185 (1973) (citing Perma Vinyl where the Labor Board stated that fiscal
liabilities can be "reflected in the price or [in] an indemnity clause").
303. Under Title VII, as set forth in MacMillan, the inability of the seller to provide "meaning-
ful" relief is a factor favoring the imposition of remedial obligations upon a successor. See supra
notes 130-134 and accompanying text. Significantly, there is no discussion in MacMillan of whether
the new owner need have an opportunity to indemnify itself against the Title VII remedial obliga-
tions. Cf Brock v. Casey Truck Sales, Inc., 839 F.2d 872, 874 n.1 (2d Cir. 1988) (Fair Labor
Standards Act liability imposed on non-party who came into existence after Department of Labor
commenced action against violator).
304. A new owner, whether a "successor" or not, is directly responsible for remedying its unfair
labor practices. See NLRB v. Davis, 642 F.2d 350, 354-56 (9th Cir. 1981); Burke-Parsons Bowlby
and Its Successor, General Wood Preservative Co., 288 N.L.R.B. No. 102, 130 L.R.R.M. (BNA)
1322 (May 12, 1988).
305. It is unclear after Fall River whether after expiration of the certification year, a successor
can postpone a bargaining obligation by insisting upon a NLRB secret ballot election as set forth in
Linden Lumber Div. v. NLRB, 419 U.S. 301 (1974). Compare Fall River, 482 U.S. at 41 n.8 with W
& W Steel Co. v. NLRB, 599 F.2d 934, 938 (10th Cir. 1979) (upholding successor's request for a
Labor Board conducted election). See Note, The Succesor Doctrine Revisited: Fall River Dyeing &
Finishing Corp. v. NLRB, 3 ST. JOHNS J. LEG. COMMENTARY 76, 96 (1987) (suggesting such an
election would be a more valid basis for transferring bargaining obligations).
306. See, e.g., EPE, Inc. v. NLRB, 845 F.2d 483, 486 (4th Cir. 1988), discussed supra, note 149
(rejecting evidence that employees no longer wished to be represented); NLRB v. Edjo, Inc., 631
F.2d 604, 607 (9th Cir. 1980) (no showing that newly hired employees "in fact" reject the union);
Saks & Co. v. NLRB, 634 F.2d 681, 686 (2d Cir. 1980) (no reason to think that predecessor's
employees hired by Saks did not yet present the same measure of union support as in predecessor's
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In sum, Fall River portends the demise of the compact implicit in Wi-
ley and explicit in Burns that the nature and extent of labor law obliga-
tions imposed upon new owners of the "employing enterprise" would be
circumscribed by the historic interest of the free enterprise system in fos-
tering the prerogatives of owners to rearrange their businesses. Although
the Supreme Court stated in Howard Johnson that a new owner could be
a "successor" for some obligations but not others, 307 the reality today is
that a "successor" is at least potentially the guarantor for all the seller's
labor-related liabilities and obligations.
VII. BUYER PROTECTION PLANS
Buyers of labor intensive operations now bear potential responsibility
for remedying a costly variety of labor-related violations committed by
the seller prior to the date of sale. In addition, union recognition and
contract adoption remedies may transfer from the seller to the buyer de-
pending upon the buyer's hiring and operational restructuring decisions.
Moreover, the seller's noncompliance with plant closing notification re-
quirements or ERISA funding requirements will also encumber the
transferability of the seller's operation by creating enormously costly lia-
bilities which neither party alone may be able to profitably absorb.
Shortly after Wiley, attorneys advised prospective buyers that protec-
tion of the considerable investment involved in the purchase of a labor-
intensive operation required a thorough investigation of the seller's labor
relations history and current labor situation.308 In the aftermath of the
liability explosion since Golden State, such an investigation has become a
"due diligence" checklist, 309 even though such general inquiries are con-
sidered "evidence" of knowledge of specific violations. A "due dili-
gence" investigation of the seller requires time, and access to the seller's
books, records, financial statements, and affected properties. Unless the
seller agrees to condition the transaction upon an investigation satisfac-
bargaining unit); Valmac Indus., Inc. v. NLRB, 599 F.2d 246, 247-48 (9th Cir. 1979) (recent Labor
Board election not necessary to trigger presumption of majority status and rejecting successor's evi-
dence of employee dissatisfaction with the union).
307. 417 U.S. 249, 262 n.9 (1974).
308. Sangerman, The Labor Obligations of the Successor to a Unionized Business, 19 LAB. L.J.
160 (1968); Spelfogel, Labor Liabilities in Purchases, Acquisitions and Mergers: The NLRB'sSucces-
sor and Accretion Doctrines, 21 LAB. L.J. 577 (1970).
309. Dilworth, Business Reorganizations and Non-NLRA Issues, 10 INDUS. REL. L.J. 59 (1988).
See also Emanuel, supra note 149, at 68; Fasman, supra note 65, at 33-38 (listing "decisional criteria"
in question form that focus on liability issues).
[Vol. 67:375
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol67/iss2/5
LABOR-RELATED LIABILITIES
tory to the buyer and grants the necessary access in exchange for protec-
tion from disclosure of confidential information, the purchase price likely
will not reflect even a minimum liability risk. Consequently, the buyer
will assume full responsibility for satisfying the seller's unremedied viola-
tions. Indeed, unless the seller agrees to these covenants, the significant
cost of transferred labor and employment law obligations alone may dic-
tate that the liability risk outweighs the benefits of acquisition.
As more liabilities are imposed upon buyers, the "due diligence"
checklist expands. Prudence requires that the checklist also anticipate
potential, novel liabilities to protect against costly surprises. At a mini-
mum, a search of the seller's existing liabilities should include examina-
tion of consent decrees, administrative and judicial violation decisions,
arbitration awards, employment contracts with managers and senior ex-
ecutives, severance pay programs, welfare and pension plan commit-
ments, and the provisions of current collective bargaining agreements.310
The potential buyer should further review pending litigation, particularly
if injunctive relief is available, employee handbooks, and affirmative ac-
tion plans. In addition, because cases have held buyers liable to remedy
violations not in complaint form at the time of sale,31' a potential buyer
should specifically inquire as to the likelihood that employment-related
issues-such as workman compensation claims-will surface before the
sale. Where the parties agree to due diligence checks, they can then ne-
gotiate a sale price which reflects the actual and potential liabilities re-
spectively retained or assumed.
Another protective option is an indemnification agreement which
holds the buyer harmless for the costs of the seller's failure to comply
with remedial orders, statutory requirements, or collective bargaining vi-
olations up to the date of sale. These agreements, however, are often
unsatisfactory because imprecise draftsmanship allows the seller to assert
contractual defenses. Moreover, the duration of the hold-harmless pe-
riod is difficult to measure against the risk of unknown liabilities that
may not surface until long after the sale. In addition, an indemnification
agreement assumes the continuation of a viable seller, at least for the
duration of the agreement. Frequently, the seller ceases operations
before the indemnification period expires, leaving the buyer without re-
course under the agreement. On balance, then, a buyer can best protect
310. See supra Part III(A).
311. See supra notes 144, 171, 297 and accompanying text.
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against the seller's financial liabilities by reducing the purchase price pro-
portionably to the potential remedial risks.
In many transactions, however, the new owner has no contact with the
predecessor and therefore has no opportunity to conduct a due diligence
investigation, to negotiate a set-off in the sale price, or obtain an indemni-
fication clause. Neither Bums nor Fall River had any negotiations with
their predecessors. In these circumstances the new owner assumes the
risk of vicarious liability.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Prospective purchasers now confront a bewildering maze of increased
monetary costs and restraints on operational flexibility in transfer of
ownership situations. Moreover, the open-ended nature of the successor-
ship doctrine increases the probability that the legal obligations upon
new owners will be further increased. These anticompetitive restraints
created by judicial and administrative action conflict with the elimination
or curtailment of regulatory market entry barriers and price controls in
the air, truck and rail industries, telecommunications, oil and gas explo-
ration and refining, and in the insurance and banking areas.
The most burdensome aspect in this evolving transfer of labor-related
obligations to innocent new owners is that the nature and extent of these
unassumed liabilities are unascertainable at the time of purchase. This
inability to reliably anticipate or forecast the operational and financial
impact upon either the seller's or the purchaser's anticipated narrow
margin of profit directly retards transferability. Every unconsummated
prospective sale consigns all the putative seller's employees to the job
market instead of allowing these employees to continue their employ-
ment with the new owner. Under these harsh economic realities fewer
and fewer entrepreneurs can invest their limited resources in the
purchase of declining businesses or in the revitalization of stagnated
industries.
It is improbable that relief from this escalating liability upon innocent
purchasers will come from Congress or administrative agencies. 2 In-
312. The enactment of W.A.R.N., congressional hearings on what is characterized as "takeover
mania," and the AFL-CIO's demand that collective bargaining agreements survive all transfers of
ownership signal further legislative impediments upon ownership transfers. Testimony of AFL-CIO
President Lane Kirkland Before Senate Finance Committee on Leveraged Buyouts, DAILY LAB. REP.
(BNA) No. 17, at D-1 (Jan. 27, 1989).
In addition, the hypothesis that employees have an extraordinary "property interest" in their jobs
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stead, purchasers must seek redress for and retrenchment of the succes-
sorship doctrine in the courts. One would hope the judiciary would be
willing to reexamine a liability created incrementally by federal "com-
mon law." Perhaps employers could trigger this overdue review by dem-
onstrating through econometric statistics that these obligations stagnate
the economy by artificially increasing the cost of market entrance and
expansion and thereby reduce employment levels and curtail the creation
of new jobs. Until then, the successor doctrine will continue to burden,
and as now expanded, ultimately to nullify a prospective purchaser's
willingness to assume the economic risk of acquiring existing operations
or reopening closed ones.
regardless of who owns the enterprise is now advanced as the justification for eliminating the tradi-
tional legal distinction between buyers and sellers. Singer, The Reliance Interest in Property, 40
STAN. L. REv. 614 (1988) (employees have property interest in their jobs). Contra Cooper v. Gen-
eral Motors Corp., 651 F.2d 249, 250-51 (5th Cir. 1981) (seniority rights are created by contract and
do not survive beyond the life of the contract).
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